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1. Introduction 
The thorough mediatisation of the world has made media literacy more necessary than ever. 
The ways in which the media we consume can affect our views without our notice has been a 
particular interest of mine ever since I became aware of it. As we are constantly surrounded 
by a wealth of information sources, awareness of the ways in which the information we take 
in can be tailored to influence our thinking is, to me, as much a self-preservative measure as it 
is an academic interest. At the same time, the freedom of the media to investigate and report 
without interference is deeply important to me as a citizen and as a writer.  
The media have a powerful position as agenda setters in the public discourse, but only to the 
extent they are free to exercise it. Problems in press freedom are an ever-present and even 
spreading concern in a world turning to strong leaders who do not tolerate criticism, and 
Japan has not escaped its share of them. Japan's ranking in the Reporters Without Borders 
(Reporters Sans Frontières, hereafter RSF) World Press Freedom index has floundered, 
sinking as low as 72 in 2016 and 2017, after a high of 11th in 2010, which is especially 
concerning given Japan's status as one of the few free democracies in Asia. A further cause 
for concern has been Prime Minister Abe Shinzō's history of proposing laws that garnered 
criticism domestically and internationally for their lax approach to the protection of civil 
freedoms. Japan's past, with a totalitarian government still in living memory, affects this line 
of concerns especially domestically.  
Press freedom is not the only principle under threat. While the internet hands the world to our 
fingertips, the average internet user's privacy is under constant threat of data mining and our 
data being sold to the highest bidder. In this environment, the importance of legal action to 
protect privacy is crucial. Yet at the same time, legislators face pressure to bolster security in 
the face of domestic and international terrorism. The unpredictable nature of terrorist attacks 
means that investigative agencies must stay ahead of the prospective attackers, and at the core 
of the effective measures is the investigation into the communications and data of suspicious 
individuals. This places security and privacy directly at odds. Finding the balance between 
effective preventive investigation and the principal human right to privacy and fair treatment 
is an ongoing discussion in many countries, all the while the recent global trend towards 
conservatism shifts focus away from the protection of individual freedoms and towards trust 
in strong leaders.  
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In Japan the discussion of this balance heated in the spring of 2017, with the publishing of an 
amendment proposal to the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and Control of Crime 
Proceeds (hereafter APOC). Prime Minister Abe's government introduced this amendment 
with the title "terrorism preparation crime proposal" (テロ準備罪法案, terojunbizai hōan), 
and emphasised an upcoming Olympic host's heightened need for effective counterterrorism 
as one of the driving reasons behind the proposed changes. As with many other 
counterterrorism laws, the APOC was criticised for the dangers its vague wording posed for 
human rights, including by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy. 
Although I have used the word 'counterterrorist' in this work's title to link to the larger 
international context, the law's actual efficacy for counterterrorism was also questioned in the 
discussion.  
Unsurprisingly, given that the government coalition, Abe's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
and the supporting party Kōmeitō, has a comfortable majority in both chambers of the Diet, 
the APOC was approved. It was brought into the Lower House in late March, and passed into 
law in mid-June, in record time. The parliament discussion was characterised throughout by 
the amount of strife between the opposition and government, and the short duration of the 
debate, as well as the shortcuts taken by the government to hasten the law's passing, were 
frequent causes of criticism.  
In order to combine my interests in civil rights and the influencing power of media, I am 
conducting a framing analysis in this thesis to examine how Japan's two largest newspapers, 
the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun and the liberal Asahi Shimbun, reported the parliament 
discussion surrounding the APOC proposal. Yomiuri and Asahi were chosen for this analysis 
because, in addition to being the two largest, they are far apart on the political spectrum yet 
not extremist in their views, and because of their extensive online databases. My main aim is 
to examine how their reporting reflects their political alignment, and to what extent they 
acknowledge the different actors and views in the discussion. The research questions are: 
1. How do Yomiuri and Asahi frame the APOC law itself, and  
the discussion in the parliament? 
2. How are they transmitting partisan sources?  
3. To what extent, and how, are they disputing or supplementing them? 
4. What are the main linguistic means they use to do this? 
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Question one is central, and to answer it I will conduct a framing analysis, modifying the 
method introduced by Baldwin van Gorp. Questions 2–4 will then be answered in a 
qualitative analysis based on the principles of Norman Fairclough's critical discourse analysis, 
centring on the differences that come to light in the framing analysis.  
For a topic this closely intertwined with civil freedoms and government accountability, not to 
mention methodologically concerned with the way author bias affects language, a liberal 
Westerner's bias must be acknowledged up front. The bias is not only mine: much if not most 
of the academic literature available to me on the topic is written with a distinctly anti-Abe 
slant. I do not claim to be more knowledgeable about Japan than the Japanese, but I will look 
at this issue with an outsider view, as neutral as I am able.  
Before the analysis, a look into the development of press freedom in Japan is in order, 
particularly to see the influence of the wartime government's censorship, whose memory still 
hangs as a shadow over civil rights discussion in contemporary Japan. This review, followed 
by an introduction of the state of the media field and press freedom today and an introduction 
of the two newspapers analysed, comprises chapter 2. Chapter 3 will introduce the APOC 
proposal and the accompanying debate in detail.  
In chapter 4 I will introduce the theoretical framework behind my thinking and the relevant 
concepts, devoting subchapters to the role of the journalist in newswriting (4.1), the concept 
of frame and the relation of frame and reality (4.2), and the principles of critical discourse 
analysis that guide my qualitative analysis (4.3). Chapter 5 introduces the methods I will use, 
the framing analysis in 5.1 and the qualitative analysis in 5.2, with a closer look at my 
research aim and hypothesis in 5.3 and an introduction of the newspaper dataset and how it 
was gathered in 5.4.  
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 will cover the analysis itself. In chapter 6, I describe the first phase of the 
framing analysis and introduce the main frames that were identified and the framing devices 
that represent them. Chapters 7 and 8 make up the bulk of the thesis. Chapter 7 focuses on the 
quantitative analysis, and covers first the nature of the newspaper coverage itself (7.1), then 
takes a look at how the newspapers transmitted the identified frames over time and across 
different types of articles (7.2). Chapter 7.3 takes a look at the different framing devices 
identified in chapter 6.3, describing which devices were the most prominent, and comparing 
the differences between the two newspapers.  
  
4 
 
Finally, chapter 8 uses the tools of critical discourse analysis to give a qualitative description 
and analysis of the dataset, supplementing the downsides of a quantitative primary analysis 
method. After descriptions of the major features of both newspapers and a brief look into the 
similarities they have, chapter 8.4 compares some major distinguishing features. In chapter 9 I 
will present the conclusions I have come to. 
Some notes on the conventions used in this thesis: I will use Hepburn romanisation for 
Japanese, except where a conventional English spelling exists, such as Tokyo, and in the 
names Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun, which are the spellings the newspapers 
themselves use. Names appear in the text in the order of their native cultural convention: 
Japanese names surname first, Western names surname last. Newspaper articles that are in my 
dataset are sourced as endnotes; other newspaper articles are sourced along with other 
references. All translations are mine unless indicated otherwise.  
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2. The Japanese media field and press freedom 
The Japanese media, privately owned and fiercely competitive on both a national and regional 
level, seem to be diverse, independent and accessible, at least on the surface (Krauss 1996: 
357). However, although they are guaranteed complete freedom by the constitution and no 
official censorship has been in place since the Second World War, the relation of the press 
and the state is not without conflict, and the policies of the incumbent cabinet in particular 
have caused concern in the more left-leaning news companies. 
The media field has been hampered by some systemic problems throughout its existence. In 
addition to a history of state censorship, at the core of these problems are the oligarchy of the 
media field, a long tradition of informal self-censorship, and the structural discouragement of 
investigative reporting. A brief look at the history of the press and press freedom is in order to 
place the analysed conversation into appropriate context. The historical sections of this 
chapter draw heavily from Laurie Freeman (2000: chapter 2), whose work on the history of 
the Japanese press is comprehensive. 
2.1 Early development 
The Japanese news media was not born, it was created as part of the Meiji restoration's efforts 
to "modernise" the country. This top-down origin coloured the development of the industry, 
as while the Western press crowned itself the Fourth Estate and watchdog of power, the 
Japanese press largely developed for the purposes of education and entertainment.  
During the civil war, the restorative movement that became the Meiji government had become 
used to both attacking with and being attacked by propaganda. When attacks from remaining 
Tokugawa supporters in the infant press did not cease after the Meiji government solidified its 
power, the government enforced a full ban on all publishing as early as April 1868. When the 
ban was lifted ten months later, it came with severe restrictions: editors had to be pre-
approved by the government, and a strict after-publication censorship was in place. This 
effectively silenced all anti-government publishing, and maintained the top-down information 
structure. The papers that survived, called the "patronage press" for their close relationship 
with the state (Freeman 2000: 34), did so by dutifully printing government bulletins and 
having little to no political content otherwise.  
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Financial support from the government, both direct and indirect, was an important factor that 
contributed significantly to the survival and growth of loyalist newspapers. Employees from 
informants to top management could be directly on the government payroll, which improved 
the stability of a newspaper's income significantly. Less directly, the government extended its 
influence by obligating prefectural governments to get newspaper subscriptions.  
In addition to financial incentives and restrictive laws governing the press, the government 
developed a system of extra-legal and informal mechanisms to guide the press into their 
desired direction. These "consultations" (kondan) provided a direct line from the people in 
power to journalists, invoking a false sense of intimacy. Between the censorship laws and 
informal pressure from the government, the media applied self-censorship to avoid costly 
pullbacks of forbidden topics. By the Taishō period the informal measures had become the 
norm of the system, and formal censorship laws were only invoked if the extra-legal system 
failed.  
With the rise of a civil rights movement in the 1870s, openly partisan political papers began 
to overtake the loyal patronage papers. These "papers of political discussion" were divided 
between a government faction, which supported the gradual introduction of civil rights, i.e. a 
constitution and an elected parliament, and the civil rights movement, which demanded these 
rights immediately. Increasingly strict censorship laws cracked down on political discussion, 
and as the goals of the civil rights movement were realised – at the government's pace – both 
patronage papers and political discussion papers came to be replaced by newspapers that 
professed a new type of journalist ideology: a formal policy of "impartiality and 
nonpartisanship" (fuhen futō), first adopted by Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, a government 
partisan paper. This proclamation was largely lip service, but proved a winning move in the 
short term. It allowed the Nichi Nichi to dodge the hand of censorship, increase its circulation, 
and hold a higher moral ground over its competitors, while still continuing to hold a pro-
government position against the civil rights movement and its supporting papers.  
Professing independence and apoliticality in the face of a sustained government effort to 
devalue politics and partisanship was not only a good move to avoid censorship, but also a 
financially brilliant one. Rebranding content as neutral "news" made the papers appealing to a 
wider audience, and limiting political discussion only to matters of national unity made them 
less offensive to the state. In essence, newspapers went back to the fundamental belief of the 
early Meiji era: that the press should act as the educators of the public, and supporters of the 
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nation. Formal non-partisanship ended up legitimising the government, which strictly opposed 
political parties and factionalism.  
Alongside the intellectual patronage papers and political discussion papers, both aimed at 
elites, a more commercially minded category of newspaper had developed. These tabloids or 
"small newspapers" (ko shimbun in contrast to "large newspapers" or ō shimbun) dealt more 
in topics that were of interest to the common people: local news, gossip, and serialised novels. 
They aimed at mass sales, and stayed safe and profitable by staying out of political discussion. 
Yomiuri Shimbun, established in 1874, began as a ko shimbun, and was soon the highest 
circulating paper in Japan.  
The organisational form that ultimately dominated the Japanese newspaper market combined 
many factors of these earlier types: the financial support from the government of the early 
industry; the careful editorial self-censorship of the patronage papers; the fuhen futō policy of 
the independent press; and the mass appeal and financial acumen of the ko shimbun. This 
combination of features from ō shimbun and ko shimbun led to the new type of paper to be 
called chū shimbun or "middle newspapers" (Nakano 2017: 31). The main chū shimbun that 
rose to dominate the industry were Osaka Asahi Shimbun and, following its lead, Osaka 
Mainichi Shimbun, the predecessors of the modern day Asahi and Mainichi Shimbun.  
While their commercial origins gave the chū shimbun a superior economic organisation and 
management structure compared to intellectual papers, the first such paper, Osaka Asahi, was 
not very profitable in its early years. In 1882 it agreed to receive covert government funding 
in exchange for spreading government policy while professing a policy of neutrality, in 
essence becoming a "camouflage patronage paper" (Freeman 2000: 42). The extra funding 
combined with increasing commercial success lead to Osaka Asahi dominating the Osaka 
market within a year. Osaka Mainichi, established on the same business model, became its 
main rival. Both these papers soon started Tokyo editions, and with the help of their secret 
government funding, began and quickly won a circulation war in the capital region. The 
Osaka based papers received an unexpected boon in the form of the Great Kantō Earthquake 
of 1923, which decimated most of their Tokyo based competitors. Three of their main 
competitors folded, and only their own Tokyo editions remained. The Tokyo based Yomiuri 
Shimbun, at this time still a gossip paper, was acquired in the aftermath of the earthquake by a 
powerful ex-bureaucrat, and began its ascent into a more serious news-focused paper.  
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The press club or kisha ('journalist') club system, which is still a central part of Japan's media 
field, originated as early as 1890 with journalists banding together in order to demand access 
to the newly formed Diet. This was granted in a limited capacity that benefited newspapers 
from major cities and started the newspapers on the track of blocking rivals from accessing 
official information (Freeman 2000: 47). As the following decades saw similar clubs 
established for other major public actors, the clubs developed rules to regulate their own 
membership and coordinate the release of information, and the basis of institutionalised 
newsgathering was formed. Exclusive and limited access to official information gave the 
clubs a close relationship with their sources, as well as an increasing amount of power over 
their employers, as clubs could block a newspaper from membership and thus hinder their 
access to information. At the same time, access to the club was tied to an understanding that 
only topics approved by the club would be released, and so if a reporter uncovered undesired 
information, an official needed only to go to their club to have it buried. This systemic 
discouragement of investigative reporting with the threat of losing access to official news has 
been a long-standing problem in the Japanese media industry.  
2.2 Wartime censorship  
The key players of Japan's media field, and the key features that allowed a remarkably 
efficient co-optation of the system for propaganda purposes during the Second World War, 
were all in place by the late 1920s. In the 1930s, as fascism rose in the government, measures 
to control the press were tightened. In 1932 ministries established an "information committee", 
with the purpose to enact the previously used extra-legal control measures of "administrative 
guidance". Four years later, the committee moved under the Prime Minister's office and was 
named the Cabinet Information Committee, then the Cabinet Information Bureau (CIB) in 
1937. The CIB became the main point of contact between the government, newspaper 
management, and journalist press clubs during the war.  
Although the Meiji constitution guaranteed freedom of expression, it was conditional as 
"within the bounds of the law", and as such the government was free to limit expression with 
wartime special laws (Yamada 2017: 119). The central law that the government relied on to 
enforce wartime censorship, the Peace Preservation Act (治安維持法, chian iji hō) of 1925, 
had ostensibly been made for the purpose of rooting out communists, and the government had 
assured the people at the time of its establishment that no ordinary citizens would be targeted 
with it. However, the scope of the law was expanded with several amendments as the 
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government's need to control information grew, and the law was used extensively during the 
war to silence those who dared to question the war effort.  
Once the war began, the efforts of the government to control the press were supported by the 
management of the main newspapers, who sought to cull competition and limit the 
independence of their journalists. The Nihon Shimbun Renmei (NSR), an association of 
newspaper publishers, carried out its "national mission" by cooperating with the state special 
police to enforce a strict one newspaper per prefecture rule, bringing down the number of 
publishing daily newspapers, weekly magazines and more irregular publications from almost 
12,000 combined to 55 between 1941 and 1943 (Freeman 2000: 53). The drastically culled 
competition led to increased circulation for the main papers, and centralisation made the 
dissemination of news much easier for the state to control.  
In addition to cutting the number of newspapers, the government also implemented a 
journalist licensing system to exclude insufficiently loyal reporters. Requirements for a 
license included at least a high school education and a sufficient grasp of "national spirit". 
Only about half of the applicants obtained the permit to continue operating; the rest were left 
unemployed as without a license, they were unable to enter press clubs and thus gain access to 
any official information. As journalists in the clubs resisted these developments, in 1943  the 
CIB and NSR established a room where all government announcements were to be made, and 
the existence of other press clubs was no longer recognised. 
2.3 Post-war development 
The combination of the Peace Preservation Act and the strictly controlled release of 
information was very efficient in providing the public with a standardised and homogenised 
image of the war effort, to the point that the American occupation authorities after the war 
were surprised how little the general Japanese public knew about either the reasons that lead 
to the war or its actual course. Although the new American-dictated constitution of Japan 
guaranteed unrestricted free speech in its 21st Article and occupation authorities were quick to 
dismantle legislative censorship structures, they also took care to implement their own 
censorship, suppressing the reporting of anti-American topics such as the atomic bombings 
and crimes committed by US military personnel (Yamada 2017: 120). In Okinawa, directly 
under US control, this restriction continued until the 1970s (Yoshimoto 2017: 243).  
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Where the occupation authorities dismantled censorship structures, they focused primarily on 
legal barriers. The informal system of administrative guidance was left largely untouched, and 
the problems of the kisha clubs received no mention at all until 1949. The clubs had been 
quickly re-established after the wartime restrictions were lifted, and their exclusive nature and 
restricted newswriting persisted. When the Allied headquarters took note of "undemocratic" 
club rules, the changes that followed were largely perfunctory, naming the clubs "associations 
for friendship and socialising", not newsgathering, while clubs in the meantime blatantly 
continued to gather news. The most effective change was the Allied decree that clubs should 
freely permit non-members to participate in press conferences, and that bureaucrats had a duty 
to report their activities to the public, a great change from CIB's wartime stance. 
Legally speaking, the height of press freedom in Japan was seen in the 1950s to the 1980s, 
between the post-war occupation censorship and the later trend of tightening information laws. 
The 1950 Broadcast Act stipulated a responsibility to report the truth and avoid political bias, 
but also established the independence of the broadcaster from state control. Although the 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications formally held licencing authority, the Broadcast 
Act was held as an ethical guideline and program contents were rarely interfered with. 
(Yamada 2017: 124) 
Perhaps ironically, the height of media liberty coincides with the height of the kisha system: 
in the 1970s, up to 90% of news content from major outlets came from official sources 
(Freeman 2000: 60, basing on the data of Hara 1979). A cynic might surmise that the 
authorities felt no need to control the media, because the media were doing such a good job of 
it themselves. 
Starting in the late 1980s, the Broadcast Act's stated aim of "contributing to the development 
of a healthy democracy" began to be viewed as a law, rather than an ethical code, and 
regulatory pressure against individual programs increased (Yamada 2017: 124). This, in turn, 
coincided with the rise of TV, which eliminated total press club monopoly on politician 
interviews. At the same time, fast changing governments after Prime Minister Nakasone's 
long tenure (1982–1987) and strengthening opposition parties eliminated entrenched club 
journalist relationships, resulting in a slight decline of the system. In 1993 a coalition 
government of several small parties ousted the LDP from power for the first time since the 
Second World War, briefly stirring the status quo by inserting itself into the system as an 
outside-context player. Hopeful signs of increasing investigative journalism after long 
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nurtured government connections broke down were, however, followed by fast 
disillusionment and a return to the status quo. (Farley 1996: 157-158)  
Since the turn of the millennium, cases of administrative guidance have sharply increased 
according to Yamato (2017: 125), and a series of new laws that are either regulatory or have 
the potential to be used to regulate the media have been passed. The most publicly criticised 
among them has been the 2013 Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (SDS), 
introduced in order to tighten the Japanese government’s control on state secrets and sensitive 
military information, which garnered a public outcry domestically and internationally for its 
perceived effect on freedom of information and freedom of the press (Fujita 2014, Repeta 
2015). The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, expressed concern for the inadequate 
definition of which matters could be designated secret, the possibility that journalists would 
be targeted for punishments for doing their work, and the lack of social norms encouraging 
the reporting of information that would be of public interest. Kaye especially urged Japan to 
modify the text of the law to explicitly protect journalists and well-meaning whistle-blowers 
from punishment (Kaye 2017: 19). 
The turn towards a stricter direction is exemplified in the 2016 conduct of then-Minister of 
Internal Affairs and Communications Takaichi Sanae, who brought up the possibility of using 
the Broadcast Act and its demand for neutral broadcasting as a reason to deny broadcast 
licenses to companies that the ministry viewed as failing in the neutrality requirement (The 
Japan Times 9.2.2016), in stark contrast to the early view of the Act as an ethical code for 
broadcasters. This is characteristic of a larger trend in Japanese politics, the shift away from 
the post-war constitution's requirement for pacifism and a revisionist attitude towards war 
history, as a new generation of politicians, free from the memories and pressures of the 
Second World War, have risen to the fore. These politicians, Abe Shinzō's generation, are 
behind the increasingly hawkish policies over recent years.  
Politicians cannot, however, be called the sole driving motor of Japan's increasingly right-
wing direction. According to Nakano Koichi, the media began shifting to the right with 
Sankei Shimbun in the 1970s, when Sankei started to criticise other newspapers as "'biased' 
and left-leaning". Yomiuri began its shift to the right in the 1980s as the new Editor-in Chief 
Watanabe Tsuneo, an associate of Prime Minister Nakasone, took more control. (Nakano 
2017: 33). The late 1990s saw an escalation of anti-left – "anti-bias" – rhetoric: from right 
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wing press such as Sankei and the Shuukan Bunshun magazine, as well as right wing 
intelligentsia, religious figures, and most of all the new generation of right wing politicians. 
The brief tenure of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) saw attempts at a change in direction, 
but illiberalism has grown further after the DPJ lost the general election in 2012. For the first 
time in post-war Japan, not only were there no believable opposition parties to LDP, but small 
right wing parties had grown that could support it (ibid. 36). 
2.4 Problems of the modern media field 
Behind the apparent diversity of the Japanese news industry lie five giant media 
conglomerates, and the national public broadcaster NHK, which control a majority of the field. 
The oligarchy of the media means concentration of power, and fewer people in executive 
positions can make the media field easier for a powerful outsider to manipulate. 
The interests of private owners can quell investigative journalism in favour of safe sales, and 
the owners' personal connections and ideologies can affect company policy (Krauss 1996: 
357), as seen with Yomiuri's shift under Watanabe. The interests of big advertisers also curb 
the commercial media. A single advertising agency, Dentsū, is responsible for nearly half of 
the advertisement spending in the country, Hakuhodō for another 20%, and criticism means 
loss of revenue (McNeill 2014: 65; Farley 1996: 139). It is also interesting to note that Dentsū 
handles the publicity for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (McNeill 2017: 166). 
The public broadcaster NHK is hardly doing better than its private counterparts. Aurelia 
George Mulgan (2017: 21) argues that the current NHK tends to act as a government PR 
organ, subject to what she calls "reverse accountability": the NHK behaves as if it is 
accountable to politicians, not politicians to it. In Philip Seaton's words the NHK has become 
a "watched dog" rather than a "watchdog" (2017: 173). 
The press has been seen by different scholars (Krauss & Lambert 2002: 2) as either a 
government lapdog or doing better at being the political opposition than the political 
opposition is. Since the decades-long dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party has left 
opposition parties with little leverage (Farley 1996: 133), this statement does not necessarily 
carry much weight. 
Western scholarship is fond of stretching the watchdog metaphor to describe the Japanese 
media. In addition to Seaton's "watched dog", Krauss (Krauss & Lambert 2002: 3–4) has used 
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the term guard dog: dutifully hounding criminals once they are found, but not seeking them 
out. George Mulgan (2017: 21) voices a fear for the mass media as a whole slipping from 
guard dog to lap dog to "pet dog", the government's loyal publicity agents.  
Unlike in the Meiji era, when newspapers feared forced pullbacks and the imprisonment of 
editors, today's media companies fear lawsuits. Financial penalties imposed on media 
companies in defamation lawsuits have seen a significant spike in the last twenty years, so 
avoiding risky topics has become the media's risk management strategy of choice (Kingston 
2017: 5). This jishuku ('self restraint', McNeill 2014: 66) or jishu kisei ('voluntary restraints', 
George Mulgan 2017: 22), is a polite way to say self-censorship. Repeta and Sawa (2017: 98) 
agree that Japan's defamation laws make it difficult to write about scandals: they are heavily 
geared towards protecting privacy and anonymity. The protection of this "anonymous society", 
where mentioning a name can result in a lawsuit, extends to politicians. As a result, 
investigative journalists are bogged down by defamation lawsuits where they have the burden 
of proof to show that their information is strictly factual (ibid.: 93). A related issue is that 
Japan does not have a law that would require officials to disclose information to the public 
(Edwards 2001: 218). Officials are also instructed to not give reporters scoops when 
interviewed and arrange to release the information in a press conference instead. 
Consequently, exclusive interviews with high profile politicians and officials are rare in Japan. 
Jishuku also extends to industry-wide silence agreements on special topics, such as any non-
official content on the imperial family, and ongoing criminal cases (Freeman 2000: 108). 
Commercial interest also curbs reporting: the widely circulated newspapers have traditionally 
aimed for as wide an audience as possible, and stories on topics like burakumin or the yakuza 
have been judged to be commercially nonviable (Farley 1996: 138). 
More practical problems curb investigative journalism as well. In kisha clubs, in addition to 
formal club rules governing the release of credentialed information, the amount of data given 
to them can be so large that the reporters can only sift through it through inter-paper 
cooperation and have no time to fact check or investigate (Freeman 2000: 75), making them 
reliant on cooperation between rivals to produce timely releases.  
The common practice of writing news articles as an anonymous group effort discourages 
journalist name-branding, and a traditional promotion system based on seniority rather than 
merit removes experienced reporters from the field to management positions (Freeman 2000: 
20). The Japanese public also has a fairly low opinion on Western-style investigative 
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journalism. In a 2015 Pew Poll (Pew Research Center 2015; referenced by Kingston 2017: 6), 
on the subject of "Global Support for Principle of Free Expression, but Opposition to Some 
Forms of Speech", only 45% of Japanese respondents agreed with the statement "it's very 
important that the media can report news without censorship in our country". This number is 
below all surveyed European countries, and 10 percentage points below the global median, 
although Kingston failed to point out that 41% of Japanese respondents still viewed lack of 
censorship as "somewhat important", compared to 46% "very important" and 42% "somewhat 
important" responses in France, so the difference is not as steep as he implied. 
While the Broadcast Act explicitly stipulated that the media should be neutral, George 
Mulgan (2017: 17–18) has noted that the laws give the government the liberty to interpret 
"fair coverage" to mean "uncritical coverage", and label all criticism of the government as 
unfair bias, as hinted at by Minister Takaichi's statement. Nakano (2017: 38) is in agreement, 
going as far as to compare the present state of the Japanese press to that of wartime, where the 
government was free to decide what is fair and impartial, and enforce its opinion as it wished. 
George Mulgan goes on to suggest (2007: 19, 22) that Prime Minister Abe is particularly 
sensitive to perceived criticism, especially media criticism, because he faces so little criticism 
in the Diet: the political opposition is weak, critical factions within his own party virtually 
non-existent, and coalition partner Kōmeitō rarely expresses criticism.  
According to George Mulgan, the "media muzzling" techniques employed by Abe's 
government include complaining directly to broadcasters; summoning executives to be 
questioned over their channel's broadcasts; angry objections to political reporters; refusing 
interviews until the media has apologised for perceived slights; granting exclusive interviews 
and scoops to favoured newspapers, or inviting journalists and executives to enjoy the prime 
minister's hospitality. These behaviours are by no means unique to Abe's government or 
unique to Japan, but George Mulgan argues that in today's Japan they are setting the tone. 
(2017: 18) 
George Mulgan and Nakano have a very negative view of the state of the press in today's 
Japan, but as a look into the history of the system has shown, the media avoiding potentially 
risky content is certainly nothing new. Cucek (2017: 77) argues in this line, stating that Abe's 
conduct as Prime Minister is not particularly out of line with the actions of previous 
administrations, nor are his powers of persuasion particularly greater than previous premiers. 
He also questions the accusations of censorship, pointing out that there is "no demonstrable 
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case of consequences that can be unequivocally attributed to intimidation or threats by the 
Abe government" (ibid.). 
Yamada (2017: 122) is somewhat in line with Cucek in stating that no formal censorship is in 
place in Abe's Japan, but fears that the recent political developments have instead created a 
social atmosphere that is intolerant of dissent, making people fearful of divulging information 
to journalists for fear of prosecution, leading to a much more efficient atmosphere of silence 
than formal censorship laws ever could. Signs of this can be seen in the RSF World Press 
Freedom Index, in which Japan's ranking has been uniquely volatile. The country peaked at a 
shared 11th place out of 178 in 2010 (RSF 2010) and has since declined steeply, culminating 
in a record low of 72nd in 2016 and 2017, and 66 in the most recent ranking (RSF 2020). The 
Fukushima disaster in 2011, during which the government severely restricted information and 
persecuted investigative journalists who attempted to get to the bottom of the incident, was 
cited as the main catalyst of this downward trend. The controversial SDS Act of 2013, which 
RSF criticises for its lack of whistle-blower and journalist protection and severe punishments, 
also still appears as a point of criticism seven years after it was passed.  
Cucek (2017: 85–86) questions the scientific validity of the RSF ranking, given that the 
information is gathered from potentially biased sources such as journalists, and says that the 
ranking is therefore more a measurement of "media mood swings" than actual developments 
in press freedom. Looking at the index as an indicator of societal atmosphere surrounding 
press freedom rather than a scientific ranking, however, still tells a damning tale of the way 
the sources view Japan's development in the last decade.  
Similarly to many other countries in the West and elsewhere, Japan has seen a recent 
normalisation of formerly extreme ideas and rhetoric. McNeill (2017: 169) argues that Abe 
didn't start this, but that he tipped the balance. Since his re-election as prime minister in 2012, 
Abe has repeatedly pushed changes in legislature that have drawn the criticism of domestic 
and international observers for limiting the civil liberties of Japanese people and particularly 
the freedom of information in the name of national security. The SDS is one of the most 
prominent changes; others include the 2015 constitutional reinterpretation to allow Japanese 
self-defence troops to practice "collective self-defence" overseas and the accompanying 
"Peace and Security Act", commonly called "security guarantee law" (安保法, anpo-hō) in 
reference to the US–Japan mutual security treaty, which it was seen as being linked to; the 
APOC, which I will discuss; the 2018 amendment to the Telecommunications Business Act 
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which allowed the government to access domestic routers and other appliances connected to 
the internet in an effort to strengthen cybersecurity (The Asahi 2.2.2019), which the Freedom 
House found particularly troubling in their Freedom of the Net survey (Freedom House 
2019); and perhaps above all, Abe's plan to greatly revise the Japanese Constitution.  
Published in 2012, the LDP's "Draft to reform Japan's constitution" (LDP 2012) makes 
significant changes to the principles of the constitution. Overall, the shift is away from the 
universalist approach of the present constitution which emphasises inalienable natural rights 
and the people as the source of sovereign power, and towards a narrative of Japanese 
exceptionalism and rights that come with obligations. Particularly, the subordination of 
freedoms and rights to "public interest and public order" has been criticised for the effect it 
could have on freedoms of expression, if individuals feared being targeted for "causing a 
nuisance" (Repeta 2013: 4).  
2.5 Yomiuri Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun  
While newspaper readership in Japan has declined with the advance of the internet as it has in 
other countries, Japan still tops the world in newspaper literacy. The big national newspapers, 
each with their own array of associated magazines and TV channels, still count their daily 
readership in millions and carry a lot of prestige.  
Yomiuri Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun are the two largest newspapers by circulation not only 
among Japan's big five, but in the world 
 
(Milosevic 2016: 58). It must be noted that the 
circulation numbers of Japanese newspapers in general are not entirely reflective of actual 
readership: the numbers reported by the Japan Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC) are 
reseller numbers, and thus include copies that never reach the consumer. The distribution 
numbers have long been inflated by a large amount of these extra papers. Some of them are 
simply backup for damaged copies, but a significant amount is suspected to be so-called 
oshigami ('push papers'), extra copy that newspaper companies pressure (or "push") the 
resellers to buy. Of the large papers, Asahi and Mainichi have both admitted to a considerable 
difference between the ABC numbers and actual distribution, while Yomiuri maintains that 
sellers have complete control over the number of copies ordered and no such thing as 
oshigami exists. (Media Kokusyo 11.3.2014) 
Yomiuri Shimbun, which had the largest circulation at 8,793,554 reported copies of the 
morning national edition in May 2017 (ABC 2017) during the examined period, profiles itself 
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as conservative and has consistently taken a stance favouring the Liberal Democratic Party 
and Prime Minister Abe in dividing issues. Yomiuri has defended the Japanese government in 
the so-called "comfort women" issue, opposes denuclearisation, and supports official visits to 
the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. 
The progressive Asahi Shimbun is the second largest newspaper at 6,216,135 reported copies 
in May 2017 (ibid.). On the political alignment scale, it occupies the furthest left position of 
the big five national newspapers, though due to the existence of the communist Shimbun 
Akahata, not the furthest of all daily newspapers. Asahi was long regarded as the newspaper 
of choice for liberal intellectuals, but this reputation was damaged in 2014 when two of its 
great investigative triumphs, the source that raised the "comfort women" issue to national 
spotlight, and the Yoshida testimony, a shocking report about the Fukushima nuclear disaster, 
were both proved erroneous in quick succession (CJR 2015). In the Reuters Institute Digital 
News Report 2018, Asahi was ranked lowest and Yomiuri highest of the main newspapers in 
public trust. Trust among those who read the paper was slightly higher overall, and closer 
together for the two papers, though Yomiuri still ranked higher (Reuters 2018: 130). 
Asahi opposes Yasukuni Shrine visits and constitutional revision, and can be relied on to 
oppose Prime Minister Abe in key issues. Its animosity with Abe dates back to 2006, when 
Asahi reported that Abe, then a young rising star of the party, had pressured the NHK to 
censor a TV program on "comfort women". Abe objected to this accusation, and Asahi 
responded to criticism by strengthening its investigative coverage (Fackler 2017: 47). 
After the Fukushima disaster in 2011, partially in response to the criticism mainstream 
newspapers had received for failing to challenge official reports of the initial catastrophe and 
investigate more thoroughly, Asahi promoted its investigative reporting unit in office 
hierarchy to a full Investigative Reporting Section (hereafter IRS), with a stated aim of 
watchdog journalism and editorial freedom to build counter-narratives to challenge the 
official truth without regard for the interests of sources or journalists in other sections. While 
the IRS was an instant success, winning Japan's top journalism award for two years running 
for its extensive and continuous Fukushima coverage, it fell from grace only three years later, 
after the Yoshida testimony on the incident at Fukushima turned into a scandal which forced 
Asahi to retract its dramatic scoop. (ibid. 48–49) 
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Asahi had already had to retract articles the same month, because the source of one of its 
previous great scoops, Yoshida Seiji
1
, who had come forward in the 1990s with his story of 
kidnapping Korean women for sex slaves in the Second World War, was proved fraudulent in 
an internal investigation. While Yoshida Seiji's story had been under suspicion since the 
1990s despite other evidence of these "comfort women" piling up, the internal investigation 
was launched as a preparation against the looming political pressure when it became likely 
that Abe was headed for another premiership, which happened in 2012 (Fackler 2017: 50). 
The combination of two large and public failures within a month made Asahi an easy target 
for the unusually spirited and unified attack it faced from rival daily papers, even fellow 
liberal Mainichi Shimbun. This isolation from their fellow journalists, as well as a dislike of 
the perceived arrogance of the IRS from within Asahi itself, may have contributed to the 
apparent ease with which Asahi folded on the Fukushima issue (Fackler 2017: 52). The 
articles based on the Yoshida testimony were redacted on September 11th, a formal apology 
was extended to TEPCO, the nuclear company, and Asahi President Kimura, a firm supporter 
of the IRS, finally resigned as an apology in December. The size and journalistic freedom of 
the IRS were slashed thereafter.  
Prime Minister Abe's involvement in this scandal is interesting. Abe had completed Asahi's 
public humiliation by denouncing it in the Upper House budget committee in October, 
criticising it for causing "numerous people to feel hurt, sorrow, suffering and outrage" and 
causing "great damage to Japan's image with its misreporting" (House of Representatives 
2014, translation Fackler 2017: 40). Abe’s behaviour as a prime minister has been 
unprecedented in the amount of exclusive interviews he grants to cooperative media, and 
Asahi has been last in line to receive his attention, after sports newspapers and even after 
some foreign publications.  
Notable in this episode are the directness with which the Prime Minister criticised a national 
newspaper; the readiness with which other large newspapers, even left-wing Mainichi, joined 
him; and the prominent rhetoric of blaming Asahi for tarnishing Japan’s honour by writing 
critical articles, rather than criticising the lack of factuality of the articles themselves. The 
chief consequence, on the other hand, was the downfall of the IRS, and with it, the 
reinstatement of the status quo of Japanese journalism. It will be interesting to see if this 
scandal in its recent history shows in Asahi's handling of the APOC debate. 
                                                          
1
 unrelated to Yoshida Masao, the source of the "Yoshida testimony" 
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3. Act on the Punishment of Organised Crimes and the debate 
A proposed amendment to Act 136 of 1999, the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and 
Control of Crime Proceeds, was presented to the Lower House of the Japanese Parliament on 
March 21st 2017. The stated purpose of the proposal, which the government had dubbed the 
"terrorism preparation crime proposal" (テロ準備罪法案 , terojunbizai hōan), was to 
criminalise the participation in a conspiracy to commit certain serious crimes, including those 
with a terrorist purpose. In his introduction of the proposal, Prime Minister Abe stressed the 
importance of the proposal as a prerequisite to ratify the United Nations’ Convention Against 
Transnational Organised Crime (TOC), which Japan had signed in December 2000 but never 
ratified. He presented the increased possibilities of international cooperation in investigation 
and information exchange that would follow from ratification as indispensable for Japan's 
ability to hold the 2020 Tokyo Olympics without fear of terrorist attacks
i
 
ii
. 
Due to significant similarities to an earlier proposed amendment to the same law, the 
opposition and much of the Japanese press began to call the proposal the "anti-conspiracy 
bill" (共謀罪法案  or 'conspiracy crime proposal', kyōbōzai hōan, in Japanese – "anti-
conspiracy bill" was the term Joseph Cannataci used in his letter
2
, and I will use it as a 
translation for 共謀罪法案). The choice between "terrorism preparation crime proposal" and 
"anti-conspiracy bill" came to be a distinguishing factor in the ensuing public debate, as those 
who favoured the law's passing used the government's preferred term and those who wished 
to see it rejected used the name of the previously rejected proposal. To avoid picking a side 
with my word choice, I have opted to refer to the proposal as APOC, short for its full formal 
name. Of the two newspapers analysed here, Asahi used "anti-conspiracy bill", while Yomiuri 
opted for "terrorism preparation crime proposal".  
The original anti-conspiracy bill the opposition was calling back to was introduced and 
rejected three times during Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō's tenure in the early 2000s. 
These proposals were unconnected to terrorism in content or rhetoric. Each attempt was met 
with a backlash for what was perceived to be dangerous possibilities of misuse and arbitrarily 
wide application on ordinary citizens due to open-ended wording and a lack of curtailments 
against misuse. The main differences between the APOC and the original anti-conspiracy 
proposals were the government's emphasis on counterterrorism as a key goal of the law; an 
                                                          
2
 see 3.1 on Cannataci 
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added limitation that the law would only apply to "terrorist groups or other organized criminal 
groups" as opposed to the previous "organisations"; and a new requirement in the APOC of 
"preparatory acts" for the planned crime before prosecution could happen. The LDP 
emphasised these differences so vigorously that even staunch supporter Yomiuri remarked on 
how noticeable the attitude was
iii
.  
In response, the opposition argued that the differences to the old anti-conspiracy bill were 
superficial, the danger to citizens' privacy was significant, and that the emphasis on 
counterterrorism was purely an attempt to garner public support. It is certain that 
counterterrorism was a late addition to the proposal. In the first government memo 
mentioning the proposal in the previous year it had been referred to as "organised crime 
preparation crime" (組織犯罪準備罪 , soshikihanzai junbizai), was later changed into 
"terrorism and other organised crime preparation crime" (テロ等組織犯罪準備罪, tero nado 
soshikihanzai junbizai) at the suggestion of the Prime Minister's official residence, and only 
became "terrorism preparation crime" as a contraction in the Ministry of Justice sometime at 
the beginning of the year
iv
.  
As the full text of the amended section is quite short (not counting appendices), I have 
reproduced it here in full. The translation is from the Japan Federation of Bar Associations' 
(JFBA) statement on 15.6.2017; to date there is no official translation of the APOC. 
Article 6 : 2(1) Two or more persons who plan, as part of activities of 
terrorist groups or other organized criminal groups, the commission of 
criminal acts listed in the following sections by such groups, are subject to 
the punishment prescribed in each of those sections, if any of them have 
arranged funds or goods or carried out preliminary inspections of relevant 
locations pursuant to the plan or other preparatory acts for the purpose of 
committing the planned criminal acts. An organized criminal group means a 
group of persons whose common purpose as the basis of organizing the group 
is to carry out the crimes enumerated in Appendix 3. However, those who 
surrender prior to executing the crime will have a reduced or exemption from 
that sentence. 
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1）Crimes listed in Appendix 4, which are punishable by death penalty, 
indefinite imprisonment, or imprisonment with or without labor for more than 
10 years - Imprisonment with or without labor for 5 years or less. 
2）Crimes listed in Appendix 4, which are punishable by either imprisonment 
with or without labor for more than 4 years but less than 10 years - 
Imprisonment with or without labor for 2 years or less. 
The biggest cause for protest comes from the appendix, where – hidden in references to other 
legislation – the total amount of "serious crimes" subject to this act is 277. Some of these have 
been pointed out to have a tenuous connection at best to organised crime. The most egregious 
examples often repeated in news reports are copying music, collecting plants from nature 
reserves, and sit-in protests against the construction of apartment buildings. 
The large number of target crimes combined with the vague definition of "organised crime 
group" caused an outcry from citizen activists, who feared that under a lax interpretation of 
the law, activist groups could be targeted as organised criminals for acts such as protesting the 
building of a power plant, which could constitute forcible obstruction of business, one of the 
target crimes. Although the government repeatedly declared that in order to be considered an 
organised crime group, a group would have to be formed for a criminal purpose, and that a 
citizen organisation, formed for the betterment of society, would not be in the scope of the 
law, several concerning precedents where the police had treated activists like criminals even 
under the current law were brought up. Meanwhile, while some police-affiliated 
commentators welcomed the law, there was also criticism that the added limitations compared 
to the old anti-conspiracy bill would make it difficult to use due to the double burden of proof 
placed on the police for both the plan and preparatory action.  
The main topics that came to be repeated in the committee debate were the possibility of 
normal citizens coming under widespread surveillance, which was connected to the possible 
violation of constitutional freedoms, and criticism of the way the government conducted 
affairs related to the proposal, which was seen as autocratic. 
The discussion in the Diet was characterised by its remarkable speed, and its remarkable lack 
of content. The amendment was presented to the Diet on March 21st 2017, and passed in the 
Lower House on May 23rd amid domestic and international protests. To hasten the 
amendment through the system before the regular Diet session was scheduled to disband in 
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June, the government bypassed a vote in the Upper House's Committee on Judicial Affairs, 
utilising an extremely rarely used clause in the parliament rulebook in order to do so. This 
garnered widespread criticism even from Kōmeitō and Nihon Ishin no Kai, who were in 
favour of the law, as well as from among LDP itself. Bypassing the vote in the committee 
brought the proposal under the vote of the full Upper House, where the law was passed on 
June 15th, less than three months after it was introduced.  
Criticisms towards the lack of real progress in the parliamentary discussion were fired from 
both supporters and opponents of the law. The opposition criticised the government's 
reluctance or inability to answer their questions in a satisfying manner, and especially 
concentrated their complaints on the conduct of Justice Minister Kaneda Katsutoshi. Kaneda 
was formally responsible for presenting the APOC to the parliament and answering questions 
in the committee, but his understanding of the law was widely considered to be poor. A 
bureaucrat from the Ministry of Justice was brought into the committee discussion to answer 
questions, which the opposition took as the government's attempt to cover for Kaneda's lack 
of ability. The government, meanwhile, criticised the opposition for repeatedly asking the 
same questions despite having been given answers, and for obstinate resistance for the sake of 
resistance, which in their view was needlessly delaying an important law for national security.  
3.1 United Nations criticism of the proposal 
Joseph Cannataci, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, published an 
open letter addressed to Prime Minister Abe on May 18th, already before the Lower House 
vote. In his letter, Cannataci expressed "serious concern" that the enactment of the bill in 
combination with other legislation would infringe on citizens' right to privacy, as well as on 
other basic rights. As Special Rapporteur on privacy, Cannataci’s main concern is about the 
lack of safeguards against arbitrary surveillance, allowing law enforcement agencies to 
authorise surveillance at their discretion (Cannataci 2017). 
In reaction, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide voiced the government's protest in a 
press conference on May 22nd, saying that Cannataci had published his letter without giving 
the Japanese government a chance to explain the legislation, and that the government 
"strongly protested" the letter's "inappropriate content". On the following day, Justice 
Minister Kaneda was reported as attempting to devalue Cannataci's criticism by saying he had 
spoken as an individual and his opinions did not reflect those of the United Nations. (The 
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Mainichi 24.5.2017. In The Japan Times 23.5.2017, Kaneda's criticism is attributed to Suga 
instead.) 
Cannataci, in turn, maintained that the government's criticism was "angry words with no 
substance", and pointed out that the Japanese officials had visited the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights to protest his letter, and were thus perfectly aware that he 
had acted in his official capacity (The Japan Times 23.5.2017).  
Abe brought up the letter when he met United Nations Secretary-General Guterres in Italy at 
the end of May, and reported upon his return that Guterres had said Cannataci was not a 
formal United Nations representative, but was "operating on his own merits"
v
. The Secretary-
General's office, in response, published a note saying that Guterres had told Abe that "Special 
Rapporteurs are experts that are independent and report directly to the Human Rights 
Council" (UN 2017). When the opposition brought up this contradiction in the Diet, Cabinet 
Secretary Suga only replied that the government's report had been correct.  
While the opposing media were quick to refer to Cannataci's letter as proof that the proposal 
should be rejected, in the Diet discussion it was primarily touched upon when the opposition 
criticised the government's response to it, not regarding its contents.  
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4 Theoretical framework 
In this chapter I will outline the theoretical base of my thesis, drawing from both framing 
analysis and different schools of critical content analysis. Roger Fowler's critical news 
analysis illustrates the philosophical starting point of how I view the nature of news and the 
journalists that construct them, as well as how I view the nature of the researcher. On this 
base, I build from framing theory, drawing in particular from the work of Robert Entman and 
Baldwin van Gorp.  
4.1 Newsmaking and the role of the journalist 
Constructivist media theory holds that language is never neutral, but inherently coloured by 
the speaker's perceptions and opinions. This is in contrast to the traditional journalist ethos, 
which maintains that in a newspaper, the editorials are the paper's opinion, while the rest of 
the reporting is neutrally presented fact (Fowler 1991: 1). Fowler in Language in the News: 
Discourse and Ideology in the Press maintains that news do not "happen": they are made. 
Facts only become news after they are selected for inclusion. This selection of topics and the 
consequent transformation of facts for the journalist's medium is guided by generally 
subconscious reference to ideas and beliefs (ibid.: 2). Ellis Krauss argued similarly that the 
subjective understanding of reality is compounded by a journalist's professional bias of what 
is objective, what is noteworthy, and what is news (Krauss 1996a: 244). 
Entman (2010: 393–394) calls this selection process the journalist's decision-making bias, 
noting that although journalists may deny any bias in their work, every individual and 
organisation that processes information must, by necessity, employ short-cut decision rules. 
Scheufele & Scheufele (2010: 112), who use the term cognitive bias, argue that all individuals, 
journalists included, are more likely to focus on information or events that align with their 
existing perception of the world.  
Bias in the sense that Entman, Scheufele and Scheufele employ it here should be separated 
from the idea of deliberate and malicious distortion of facts. A decision-making bias is simply 
the human mind at work. In Fowler's words, "because the institutions of news reporting are 
socially, economically and politically situated, all news is always reported from some 
particular angle" (1991: 10).  
Entman divides bias into decision-making bias and content bias. The latter he separates 
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further from slant. These resemble more the common language definition of bias in the news: 
in Entman's terms, slant is similar to what Fowler terms a skewed representation (1991: 12), 
and appears where a news report emphasises one side's preferred angle while ignoring or 
derogating another side's. Slant can be deliberate, or appear without the reporter's conscious 
choice to favour a side if one of the sources available delivers their message significantly 
more skilfully or persistently than the other. If a slant in media holds up consistently over 
time, Entman deems it a content bias. (Entman 2010: 392–393)  
Not even a content bias needs a deliberate decision to distort the facts behind it: it can result 
from journalists' decision-making biases. In addition to sometimes subconscious mental and 
ideological biases, two notable decision-making biases must be mentioned: the capitalist 
concern of what is going to sell most copies and get the most subscribers (Entman 2010: 393, 
Lawrence 2010: 265), and the press' prized watchdog mentality, which emphasizes the 
noteworthiness of exposing wrongdoings by authority. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the watchdog mentality is a lesser concern to the Japanese press than it is in the West. 
Lawrence also notes that journalists can look for a contrarian angle on purpose, purely for the 
sake of objectivity (ibid.). 
The capitalist bias and Krauss's noteworthiness bias work together to cause the news media to 
perpetuate whichever status quo is in effect: if news from a particular source sells, it must 
mean the readership thinks it's important, which means it must be reported again. Fowler 
notes that access to the media is reciprocal: people that give the media access to the content it 
wants to publish can trust they will have access to publicity for the content they want to 
broadcast. Imbalance in this access leads to partiality not only in what assertions and attitudes 
are reported but also how they are reported (Fowler 1991: 22). Even if the media were not 
intending it, choices in language can undermine the attempted angle. In Japan, the rigid 
structure of the press and its reliance on credentialed fact in reporting makes it particularly 
vulnerable to this. 
In this work, I will use Entman's definitions of decision-making bias, content bias and slant to 
examine the objectivity of my material. Where the word bias appears without a modifier, it 
refers to content bias. 
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4.2 Frame and reality  
There are almost as many definitions for the term frame as there are applications of framing 
theory. As a wide and somewhat loosely defined field, framing research has focused on 
everything from the deliberate publicity spinning of political actors to deep concepts 
resonating in the consciousness of a culture. Both of the former are factors that will influence 
a journalist at their work – however, they are not in themselves the focus of this thesis. 
In a widely quoted definition, Entman (1993: 52) defined framing as selecting "some aspects 
of a perceived reality and [making] them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way 
as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation." Entman also identifies four distinct locations where framing 
takes place: the communicator's judgment of what to say; the text itself, where frames 
manifest by the presence or absence of culturally recognisable triggers; the receiver's 
interpretation of the text influenced by their own schemata of frame recognition; and finally 
the culture, as the hive mind collection of recognisable frames (ibid.). In contrast, Nisbet 
(2010: 47) defines frame as one of three things: an interpretive schema used by audience to 
make sense of a topic; a way for journalists to condense complex topics into a digestible form; 
or a way for policy makers to define options and reach decisions, thus omitting Entman's text 
and culture and separating his communicator into journalists and politicians. This last 
category approaches Brewer and Gross's (2010: 159) concept of partisan frame, employed to 
"highlight certain information and ideas in order to present one position (or set of positions) 
as correct and all other positions as being wrong" typically by those seeking to coax the 
receiver’s opinion behind their preferred policy.  
Nisbet and Entman are in accord that framing gives greater importance to certain aspects of a 
topic at the expense of others, and in this process defines why something is an issue, who is 
responsible, and what should be done (Nisbet 2010: 47, referring to Entman 1993 among 
others). As humans tend to resist information that clashes with their existing opinions, this 
definition is most efficient when it resonates with the audience's existing perceptions and 
values (Nisbet 2010: 47). Failing to accurately convey "conventional wisdom" about a topic 
leads to the risk of losing public trust (ibid. 45) and thus a paying audience. While most 
people will not be swayed from their views by a news story, Entman (2010: 392) argues that 
the key targets of political framing are firstly people with no strong convictions on the topic 
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who may be swayed, and secondly other political elites, who have the actual decision making 
power. 
The crucial difference between Entman's and Nisbet's frame definitions is the location of the 
frame: for Nisbet the frame is a schema in the mind; for Entman the frame is interpreted 
through a schema in the mind, and the frame itself resides in the cultural consciousness. Van 
Gorp, whose work on framing research (van Gorp 2005, 2010) forms the core of the method I 
will apply, takes the latter view, and for the sake of consistency I will follow.  
Van Gorp (2010: 87 and elsewhere) has noted on the appeal of culturally embedded frames 
to journalists, as they are ready narrative ingredients that the audience is likely to recognise. 
While all human interaction necessarily happens against a cultural backdrop, culturally 
embedded frames are distinct from issue-specific frames and generic news frames in their 
utilisation of cultural archetypes or shared experiences. For example, while 'conflict' may be a 
generic frame, 'conflict of good and evil' will have culturally differing specifics and 
archetypes and is therefore a culturally embedded frame. 'Policy conflict' would be an 
example of an issue-specific frame in the same vein. Regardless of issue specificity, a frame 
must be abstract enough to be applicable to multiple source texts to function as a research tool. 
In van Gorp's method, the distinction of frame as a cultural structure triggered in the receiver's 
consciousness and framing device and reasoning device, which are present in the text, is 
central. These devices operate as cues from the sender to the receiver to construct a particular 
frame for the occurrence described (van Gorp 2005: 486). Framing devices are the textual 
indicators that evoke a frame: themes, metaphors, stereotypes, lexical choices, myths, 
narratives, contrasts, appeals to emotion or logic, as well as supralinguistic features such as 
source selection, statistics, graphics and images. What van Gorp has termed reasoning devices, 
on the other hand, are Entman's four functions of framing: defining a problem, assigning 
responsibility, casting moral judgment and suggesting solutions. Reasoning devices may 
manifest explicitly in the text or be evoked circumventively by the choice of framing devices, 
but any of the four functions may also be missing entirely. (van Gorp 2005: 487, 2010: 85–86, 
94) 
Almost as central to the function of a frame as what it adds salience to, is what it erases. We 
do not easily notice when we're not being told something (Kuypers 2010: 300), and thus 
utilising this lack of attention to negative space is an effective way for partisan actors to direct 
opinion (Entman 1993: 54). If framing requires selecting some aspects for increased salience, 
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other aspects must in turn be selected for exclusion. In a discussion dominated by one frame, 
aspects this frame excludes will disappear from the discussion, and stray contrary opinions, 
where they break the glass ceiling of attention, will have low salience (Kuypers 2010: 301). 
Frames can also be codominant, when contrary opinions appear in equal or near-equal 
measure, either within the same articles or alternating in a newspaper's coverage. Codominant 
frames can also support each other, while being distinct enough in their devices that labelling 
them a part of the same frame is not adequate. 
In this work, I am examining only the frames apparent in newspaper output, and specifically 
the differences between two politically opposite newspapers which are basing their coverage 
largely on identical sources. What sources do Yomiuri and Asahi choose to include? How do 
they portray the sources they include? To distinguish between devices introduced by partisan 
sources such as quotes from politicians, and devices introduced by journalists themselves, I 
am employing partisan frame and journalist frame as separate categories.  
4.3 Critical discourse analysis 
In addition to framing analysis, I will further analyse some salient features of the texts in a 
comparative critical discourse analysis. The primary theorists whose work I will base my 
analysis on are Fairclough (1989, 1995), and Fowler (1991), who partitions the analysis of 
news reports as a discourse category specifically into critical news analysis.  
Fairclough (1995: 17) defines discourse as "language as social practice determined by social 
structures". Fowler, meanwhile, describes news in specific as a discourse which is far from a 
neutral reflection of fact, but intervenes in the social construction of reality (1991: 2. Fowler 
borrows the term 'social construction of reality' from Berger and Luckmann's 1976 book by 
the same name.) 
Lexical choice is a powerful factor in frame building and a key target of analysis. The terms 
chosen to refer to the central actors or concepts of a situation can, with negative or positive 
connotations, determine the frame that the text presents so cogently that even the inclusion of 
several devices of an opposing frame will not change it. Of particular interest is the inclusion 
of what I have termed words of power: concepts of such emotional or cultural resonance that 
evoking them inevitably garners a strong reaction from the receiver. For this, Fairclough's 
concept of the experiential value of words will come in useful. One of the aspects of 
experiential value he describes is "how ideological differences between texts in their 
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representations of the world are coded in their vocabulary" (Fairclough 1989: 112). This is 
exactly the feature I wish to examine. 
In addition to terminological choice, ideological differences can be visible in the verbs chosen 
to describe words or actions. Fowler (1991: 230–231) specifically notes the importance of 
examining reporting verbs used in reporting authority: "critical analysis should pay particular 
attention to how what people say is transformed." He (ibid. 128) also remarks on the use of 
impersonality as a significant style choice: impersonalising people by encoding them in the 
abstract will distance the reader from them emotionally. In Fowler's example of a newspaper 
article discussing medical files, patients are referred to in consistently depersonalising and 
agency-stripping ways ('patient', 'case'), while doctors and politicians are referred to by name 
or professional title. This is a concrete example how the choice of language can undermine 
the attempted angle: you cannot defend the little man using the big man's vocabulary (ibid. 
23).  
Closely connected to lexical choice, voice is an important concept to examine when 
determining writer sympathies. Voice refers to the choice of who gets to speak, whose words 
are selected for inclusion in a text and whose words are reported in a positive or negative light, 
as well as which side is grammatically presented as the active agent of a sentence or text 
(Fang 2001: 601). Voice and lexical choice intertwine into credence, examining not only who 
gets to speak, but how much weight is put on their credibility as a source. 
Voice and word choice are both examples of the use of marked or unmarked formulation. 
Ensink and Sauer refer to Mikame Hirofumi (1996), who argued that choosing an unmarked 
formulation such as an active sentence is the default state, and communicatively salient 
marked formulations (like passive) can be opted for when the speaker wants to signal that 
another perspective is more important than the subject's. (Ensink and Sauer 2003: 10–113) 
Cornelis has presented a similar case of analysing the grammatical agency of a text to 
determine writer sympathies. According to Cornelis "empathy is expressed -- through the 
selection of a particular entity in the subject role" (2003: 172). Active voice is the unmarked 
presentation, and conversely if the passive is used, there is a marked effort to deter reader 
                                                          
3
 The article that Ensink and Sauer refer to is Mikame, Hirofumi 1996: "Markierte Perspektive, perspektivische 
Annäherung des Sprechers an das Objekt und direkte Wahrnehmung. Zur Signalisierung der 
psychischkognitiven Nähe des Sprechers zum Objekt", published in Sprachwissenschaft, 21 , 367– 420. As this 
article is in German, which I do not speak, I am basing my reference on Ensink and Sauer. 
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identification with the sentence's actor. Cornelis used a manufactured sports reporting data set 
to prove that readers were able to identify which "news article" was written by which 
imaginary football team's hometown paper.  
Another interesting point for grammatical analysis is what Fairclough (1995: 4–5) calls 
hedging and modalising: modal adverbs (eg. probably, maybe), as well as the choice of 
presenting a statement as either qualified (eg. it will happen) or categorical (eg. it could 
happen). To further distance the writer from responsibility, a writer can modalise by 
presenting a statement with a qualifier such as "critics say" or "there have been concerns that" 
to "mitigate and disclaim responsibility for a damning judgment" (ibid. 5). Fang has also 
noted on this, saying that "by giving voice to an undefined anonymous group --, the 
newspaper gives the impression that this belief is widespread, leaving the reader with little 
means of verifying the accuracy of the statement" (Fang 2001: 610). 
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5. Method and research design 
Just as the journalist cannot avoid their existing beliefs subconsciously affecting the news 
they produce, it is also impossible for the researcher to be a perfectly neutral outsider. As I 
have taken the view that framing partially takes place in the receiver's mind, with the message 
interpreted through each person's own cultural schemata, I must acknowledge that my own 
mind inevitably affects the results I get as a researcher. The difficulty of balancing cultural 
recognisability to the Japanese and outsider view must be considered – a frame may be more 
easily viewable from the outside, when one is not steeped in it, but I must take care to not 
impose Western frames on Japan. To combat this reality as well as I am able, the research 
method described in this chapter has been chosen for its explicit attempt to minimise the 
effect of subjectivity on a framing study, although the lack of a corps of research assistants 
has forced me to modify van Gorp's method from its ideal condition.  
5.1 Hybrid framing analysis 
My framing analysis will be based on the method presented by van Gorp (2005, 2010). In 
these works, he outlines a method specifically designed to minimise the effect of researcher 
subjectivity on framing analysis. Van Gorp notes that a framing analysis that concentrates too 
much on reliability checks, such as counting catchwords as framing devices, to produce an 
absolutely repeatable quantitative result, runs the risk of missing the frame evident in less 
overt devices (2005: 488, 2010: 99). Since framing takes place in the mind, interpretation 
must happen to examine it.  
Van Gorp's method includes an inductive framing analysis, where "the spectrum of 
conceivable frames that are relevant for the topic under scrutiny is identified" (van Gorp 
2010: 91) without a predetermined set of frames, and then a deductive analysis, where the set 
of framing devices obtained in the inductive analysis is then tested against a target dataset and 
the objective is to examine to what extent the previously identified frames occur. In the pure 
form of the method, which van Gorp demonstrates in his 2005 article, the inductive analysis is 
performed on a collection of separate sources representative of the societal discourse 
surrounding a particular topic, and a deductive analysis then performed on a newspaper 
corpus. This results in an extensive look into how various newspapers reflect issue discourse, 
and which partisan frames they reproduce.  
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My aim differs slightly from this, in that the newspaper reporting of an issue active in 
parliament already includes the primary sources of partisan frames. Rather than examining the 
newspaper reproduction of frames extant in society, my interest is in examining how they 
convey partisan frames as they are produced, and how, if at all, they question them. For this 
reason I have chosen to perform the inductive analysis on my target newspaper material, 
categorising the origins of each framing and reasoning device separately.  
In van Gorp's method, the inductive analysis is further divided into three processes: open, 
axial and selective coding. These processes are iterative rather than sequential, meaning 
repeated examination of the source material is necessary as new connections become evident. 
Open coding is the analysis of texts without a predefined strategy, noting the features of 
language and thematic choice which may influence the reader's interpretation – the concrete 
language which indicates possible framing and reasoning devices. Axial coding is the 
organisation of these findings into groups centred around meanings, looking for patterns, 
connections and overarching ideas. Axial coding is the first step away from the level of each 
individual text, linking instances to find devices. In this stage, knowledge of cultural context 
becomes crucial. The final stage, selective coding, sorts out the tentative framing and 
reasoning devices into a frame matrix, where each column represents a framing and 
reasoning device, and each row the complete frame package that makes up the frame. In this 
stage, some features of the axial coding will be left out, and open coding may need to be 
repeated as cells of the frame matrix remain unfilled. (van Gorp 2010: 93–96) 
I will perform this sequence of coding processes on a newspaper dataset introduced in chapter 
5.4.  
The second stage, deductive analysis, is then performed according to the principles of 
quantitative content analysis. Most of the deductive analysis as van Gorp presents it is 
inseparably reliant on the work of coders who were not involved in the inductive analysis, and 
as such I have been forced to deviate from the model as it was presented. Van Gorp 
recommends two coders who both go through the entire material independently for the most 
reliability. Working alone, I had wanted to run my material through the deductive phase twice 
instead, and compare the two results to maximise reliability, but due to time constraint and the 
large amount of data this proved undoable. 
Van Gorp names the construction of a codebook as the first step of the deductive stage. The 
codebook should, according to him, comprise of simple questions designed to capture the core 
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idea behind the frame, and not necessarily every single framing device, and be phrased in 
such a way as to minimise the coders' need to interpret the material, ideally with yes/no 
questions. The codebook should further be presented not as grouped according to frame 
package, but in such a way as to minimise the possibility of coders conjecturing frame 
packages and adjusting their answers to match. The coders' results would then be run through 
a series of statistical analyses to determine if the frame packages that were the end result of 
the inductive analysis were accurate, and to what extent they occurred. (van Gorp 2010: 99–
102) 
As my knowledge of the results of the inductive analysis is naturally comprehensive, I have 
instead chosen to perform the quantitative analysis on each framing device, and benefit from 
the chance to compare their relative frequency, weight, and collocation. As the deductive 
analysis performed in this way will primarily quantify the results of the inductive analysis, I 
hesitate to call it a full deductive analysis, preferring to call the whole a hybrid analysis that 
takes features of both the stages of van Gorp's method.  I applied the codebook portion of the 
method to minimise the risk of deviating midway and falling into an endless cycle of 
adjustment and addition. My codebook is included in Appendix A of this thesis to facilitate 
the repeatability of this study.  
As a result of these differences in the deductive phase, my analysis will not answer the 
question "which partisan frames are reflected in which newspaper, and how clearly?", as van 
Gorp's does, but instead "to what extent does each newspaper reflect each frame, and what 
means do they use to achieve that?" 
5.2 Qualitative analysis of distinguishing features 
The downside of van Gorp's method as I'm applying it is that different instances of a framing 
device will inevitably carry different amounts of frame evoking power – such as different 
word choices that both evoke the same feeling but to a different degree – yet will be counted 
as equal in a quantitative analysis only concerned with tallying instances. To supplement the 
downsides of a fundamentally quantitative primary method, I will also examine some key 
points of difference in a more qualitative analysis. 
The primary thing I want to analyse is what lexical and grammatical features characterise the 
main points of difference between Asahi and Yomiuri. For this, I will utilise some features of 
Fairclough's three-stage critical discourse analysis (outlined in 1989: 109–111). Primarily 
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this analysis will be concerned with the description stage, based on the results of the framing 
analysis but also remarking on devices that point to other frames than the dominant ones 
chosen for deductive analysis. The questions I ask of the text are based on those Fairclough 
outlines in chapter 6 of 1989. 
1) What experiential values do words have? In particular, are there words  
which are ideologically contested? 
2) What relational values do words have? 
3) What experiential values do grammatical features have? 
4) What relational values do grammatical features have?  
The interpretation and explanation stages of Fairclough's method are remarkably similar in 
philosophy to the interpretive stages of framing analysis. As Entman and van Gorp stress the 
similarity of the researcher's and the original recipient's processing of the framing devices, so 
does Fairclough stress the similarity of what the analyst and the discourse participants do in 
terms of interpretation. Interpretation is an interplay of the cues in the text and the interpreter's 
resources, that is, the knowledge of the situation and background that they have (Fairclough 
1989: 141). In this sense it is very close to the understanding of culturally embedded frames. 
The explanation stage, meanwhile, is primarily concerned with examining discourse as part of 
a social structure, analysing the ways discourses sustain or change the interpreter’s 
understanding, and that in turn sustains or changes social structure (ibid. 163).  
Due to this similarity, I will not implement the latter two stages to their full extent. Since the 
latter stages of Fairclough's method so resemble the process of a framing analysis, using its 
first stage to explicate the linguistic instances behind the frames is a good fit, but especially 
worked in close connection with a framing analysis, the results of an interpretive discourse 
analysis would likely only mirror those of the preceding framing analysis. I will employ 
interpretive features in analysing the devices I have described, and draw explanations based 
on the combined results of the description and the framing analysis, but doing an in-depth 
critical discourse analysis back-to-back with a framing analysis is neither feasible nor 
meaningful.  
5.3 Aim and hypothesis 
The object of the study is to examine how reporting reflects the political alignment of 
newspapers in a conservative political climate, to identify the main frames they transmit to 
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their readers, and to describe these frames, with attention to the extent their origin is partisan 
or journalist. It will be interesting to see whether the worries for the declining state of Japan's 
press freedom reflect in the results, and how the watchdog mentality comes up in the coverage, 
concerning both its historical lack of significance and the Asahi investigative reporting 
section's recent fall from grace. 
Based on the newspapers' stated alignments and reporting history, it is presupposed that 
Yomiuri will support the government's angle, and Asahi will oppose it. The interest lies in the 
nature of the frames they utilise to do this. My hypothesis based on the parliament discussion 
is that the main competing frames will be a security frame, emphasising the threat of terrorism 
to the Japanese people, and a civil freedoms frame, emphasising the threat of widespread 
surveillance. What non-dominating frames appear will likely be used to support these two. 
Further, I postulate that for both newspapers the uncritical transmitting of partisan frames 
from the parliament will occupy the majority of the coverage, signifying a lack of 
investigative reporting. Asahi will likely also report the popular protests opposing the law, 
and do so in a positive, heroic light, but Yomiuri may omit coverage of anti-government 
activism entirely.  
5.4 Data 
The newspaper data was obtained from both newspapers' online article databases. The 
examined period is from March 22nd 2017, the day after the proposal was introduced in the 
Lower House, to June 16th, the day after the law was passed. The one-day offset is due to 
newspaper printing schedule. While I chose this time period specifically to examine the 
transmission of the parliament discussion, the proposal's existence, though not its precise 
contents, was known since at least the previous year, and Asahi ran a near-weekly series of 
focus articles on it since February. Therefore, the beginning of the examined period is not the 
beginning of the discussion.  
For the sake of both consistency within the results and comparability between the two 
newspapers, I limited the search to the morning Tokyo editions, which have the widest 
circulation among both newspapers' various editions. Editorials and reader letters are included 
in the material, but transcripts of parliament discussions, which both newspapers printed 
following major developments, are omitted since as word-for-word transmissions of 
politicians' words they would not have brought anything new to the material. While it could 
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be argued that reader letters and interviews similarly transmit partisan frames word-for-word 
and therefore tell nothing of the newspaper's own framing, it must be remembered that 
interviewees and letters to the editor are always chosen for inclusion, and this choice carries 
an agenda-setting power too great to ignore. Search results were counted as separate articles if 
they appeared as such in the database, despite some entries in both newspapers appearing on 
the same page of the physical paper. 
To account for the two different names used to refer to the law, I ran the search as a Boolean 
OR search for the terms 共謀罪+法 (kyōbōzai, 'criminal conspiracy', + hō, 'law'), and テロ準
備罪 (terojunbizai, 'terrorism preparation crime'), including some variant spellings for the 
latter
4
. With these parameters, the Asahi database returned 278 articles, and the Yomiuri 
database 120 articles. Due to the large number of items, I excluded articles that mention the 
proposal while being primarily on another topic. The majority of these mentions were simply 
recounting the remaining agenda of the current parliament session. This exclusion is 
unfortunate, but necessary to prune excess data items which would not provide content for the 
qualitative analysis.  
With this added condition, the number of articles became 219 from Asahi, and 97 from 
Yomiuri. These are the articles I will examine for the framing analysis. Due to the large 
number of articles, the aim is not to make an in-depth qualitative analysis of all of them, but 
regard the majority as mass data for the quantitative review and raise examples of key 
differences into the qualitative inquiry. 
Already interesting is the clear divide in the primary terms used by the two newspapers. 
Yomiuri's coverage included 19 articles which mentioned the word kyōbōzai – and out of 
these, only two did not additionally mention terojunbizai. Meanwhile, Asahi only mentions 
the term terojunbizai in two articles, one of which is an article about this exact difference. 
According to the Asahi articlevi, among the big five national newspapers, Yomiuri and Sankei 
Shimbun used terojunbizai, while Asahi, Mainichi Shimbun and the economic Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun opted for kyōbōzai. Nihon Keizai Shimbun profiles itself as centre-right conservative, 
but otherwise these choices reflect the political left–right divide.  
                                                          
4
 For the sake of clarity, I will refer to all variant spellings of テロ準備罪 with this term. 
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In the next chapter, I will further introduce the data as I present the results of the inductive 
framing analysis.  
6. Inductive framing analysis 
In this chapter I will describe first the process, then the results of the inductive framing 
analysis performed according to van Gorp's method, presenting and describing the frame 
matrix.  
6.1 The coding process 
The first stage of analysis to complete was open coding. I went through the texts, looking for 
words, structures, themes, archetypes, any linguistic and thematic instances that suggested an 
attempt to influence the reader's interpretation. At this stage I deliberately dismissed any 
notion of identifying the underlying frames, to avoid skewing my analysis. In order to achieve 
this, I went through the coverage day by day, rather than paper by paper, to avoid getting 
caught in a single narrative. I also did not differentiate between the journalist and various 
partisan frames, instead marking down everything indiscriminately. The amount of possible 
devices varied greatly from article to article, but there were only stray short news notices 
where I could not find evidence of an angle. 
As I worked through the material, I also marked down the length and type of articles. The 
article category classification I arrived upon was: news, focus, opinion, interview, and 
editorial. 'News' covers all articles where the primary topic was the reporting of a new 
development; 'focus' articles are ones that concerned the APOC itself in an examining or 
explaining capacity, without a link to any specific news story; 'opinion' pieces are reader-
submitted content, plentiful in especially Asahi's coverage and overall more varied in their 
angles than the paper's other output. 'Interview' straddles the line between the last two, with 
experts of various fields giving their opinions on the subject. These were uniformly presented 
as direct quotation from the interviewee, without interjection from the newspaper. Lastly, 
'editorial' covers leading editorials but also journalist comment columns and similar pieces 
that present the newspaper staff's direct opinions.  
After this, the next stage was the axial coding. Going through the open coding material, I 
separated the individual instances from the texts, clouding them together to link features and 
find the underlying patterns. As hypothesised, two distinct clouds of meaning began to form: 
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devices linked to the government's proposed angle of national security and terrorism, and in 
contrast devices linked to the opposition's angle of threat to civil freedoms. However, a third 
major centre also became evident: devices that described the attitude and motives of the 
involved politicians, without reference to the law itself. 
This third cloud of devices was clearly divided into pro- and anti-government sentiment. It 
was at the same time distinct from the freedom–security dichotomy and yet irrevocably linked 
to it, since the ways in which politicians and parties are described affects the receiver's 
understanding of their competence and therefore the validity of their arguments. The high 
number of devices describing the political strife surrounding the law, rather than strictly the 
law itself, presented a substantial difficulty in the selective coding phase.  
6.2 Political strife as a linked factor in the selective coding 
Although freedom and security appeared as the primary frames used to portray the APOC 
itself, that was far from the whole conversation. Alongside the debate centring on the law's 
contents, necessity and possible consequences, the politicians' conduct during the debate 
received constant attention, with the newspapers clearly split between whose actions they 
view as rightful. Description of political strife in the parliament, picking sides and vehemently 
advocating for them, takes up a significant part of the total coverage.  
The amount of attention paid to political strife rather than content gave me difficulty in 
formulating the frames. As the political conflict clearly follows the same line as the freedom–
security divide, with the government pushing a security angle and the opposition pushing a 
freedom angle, descriptions of the parliament discussion become inseparable from the 
framing of the law itself: the way in which the newspapers talk about the discussion colours 
the topic itself. Due to the clearly opposing angles of opposition and government, description 
of the conflict overlaps with the security and freedom frames where strife is portrayed as a 
problem interfering with the rightful goal. Moreover, for the civil liberties camp, criticism of 
the government is linked to the fear of putting such a law into the hands of a government 
perceived as autocratic and oppressive. On the other side of the divide, emphasis on the 
unruly behaviour of the opposition devalues their arguments and portrays them as obstinate 
and ignorable. 
The description of the discussion therefore appears as an important part of the framing of the 
law. But does the portrayal of political strife belong in the freedom–security matrix? To test 
  
39 
 
this, I attempted to matrix the devices referring to the political process and strife separately 
from the freedom–security devices. However, for reasons detailed in the previous paragraph, 
it proved difficult to separate the debate from the content, and the longer I tried, the more I 
felt this separation was artificial and would harm the results of the analysis. The divide 
between support for and distrust of Abe Shinzō runs much deeper in the two newspapers than 
the coverage of this single law debate, and if my aim were to examine the portrayal of him 
and his government in general, the devices here could certainly be placed into a matrix 
centred on that issue. However, as the competence and trustworthiness of the authorities is 
intrinsically important to the primary debate of the law's contents, I have chosen to place the 
political strife devices into the freedom–security matrix.  
The modifications I have made into the van Gorp method come in useful for this. With my 
data, it is possible to analyse the frequency of each framing device and clearly quantify the 
most predominant ones. This is especially interesting for Yomiuri's coverage: much of Asahi's 
criticism of the government falls securely under the umbrella of civil freedoms and fear of the 
government curtailing them, but Yomiuri's concentration on political strife is more difficult to 
clearly link to the security frame. Before the definitive results of the quantitative analysis it is 
uncertain whether the security frame is truly the dominant one in Yomiuri's coverage, or 
whether it is more accurate to re-categorise the devices into a security frame and a 
codominant political strife frame.  
6.3 Frame matrix and representative framing devices 
Table 1 (on the following page) presents the devices that best represent the security frame 
and the freedom frame as they were invoked in this material. These are the devices that I will 
analyse in the next chapter, with particular attention to the embedded political strife devices. 
In particular it is the reasoning devices, those concerning the identification and solution of 
problems, which centre on the conduct of politicians. 
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Table 1. Representative framing and reasoning devices for dominant frames in the APOC discussion 
 Freedom frame Security frame 
Reason for the law increasing surveillance; making it harder 
to oppose the government 
counter-terrorism; signing the TOC 
treaty 
Consequences of the 
law 
human rights limitations; surveillance 
society; constitution infringement 
better investigation; better safety; 
possible to hold the Olympics 
Problem definition 
vague criteria; possibility of arbitrary 
investigation; possibility of ordinary 
people being targeted; expansion of target 
crimes; law unrelated to terrorism 
danger of terrorist attack; danger of other 
organised crime; insufficiency of the 
current law; opposition's repetitive 
arguments 
Problem source 
inconsistency of government arguments; 
authoritarian behaviour of government; 
apathetic citizens 
misinformed opposition politicians and 
citizens; opposition's irresponsibility 
Possible solutions 
careful consideration; popular protest; 
rejecting proposal to try again better; 
cooperation with Cannataci 
government must explain the law 
carefully; government must make sure 
law is implemented shortly; opposition 
must stop stalling 
Comparison 
Peace Preservation Act; similarity to old 
Anti-conspiracy bill; other signatories did 
not make new laws 
difference from old Anti-conspiracy bill; 
other signatories have stricter laws 
Metaphor, stereotype stereotype: Abe as the despotic ruler;  
LDP as "yes-men" 
stereotype: opposition as the 
small-minded contrarian 
Appeal to emotion 
fear of being invaded, being watched; 
shame of needing to be corrected by 
outsiders 
fear for personal safety; shame of not 
being up to standard 
Moral duty 
of government to protect citizens' rights; 
of Japan to comply with international 
human rights; of press to watch those in 
power; of politicians to make meaningful 
debate 
of government to protect citizens' lives 
and public order; of Japan to ratify 
international treaty and cooperate in 
international investigation 
Sources opposition politicians; demonstrators and 
citizen activists; intelligentsia 
government politicians; police 
Lexical choices 
"fundamental human rights"; "arbitrary 
application"; "withering" of civil society; 
Terminology: "Anti-Conspiracy Act", 
"steamroller voting"; "threat to 
democracy"; "death of the parliament" 
"indispensable" for treaty ratification and 
Olympics; opposition "fearmongering" 
and "irresponsibility"; Terminology: 
"Terrorism preparation crime" 
Visuals protesters, particularly at night disorder in the parliament; shadowy 
figures as threat, explosions 
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The devices of the freedom frame place the government as the major threat, and authoritarian 
or simply incompetent conduct of the authorities as the central problem. In contrast, the big 
threat of the security frame is international terrorism, and the problem lies in the 
irresponsibility of opposition parties and a lack of accurate information. Interestingly, the 
frames have significant similarities despite being opposite: from the matrix it is already 
evident that they both hold the protection of society as a primary goal. The great difference 
lies in whether they consider the danger to be protected against to be a violent threat, or a 
social change under an authoritative government. Both sides also invoke the same emotions in 
response to the APOC: fear and shame. In both frames, shame is linked to the reaction of the 
international community, and thus to Japanese national pride. Both sides also frequently 
ground their reasoning in a moral duty, although the precise duties invoked differ greatly. 
In the shape that they occur, I define the freedom and security frames as culturally embedded 
frames. Although freedom and security as concepts are universal, the devices apparent in the 
text link both very distinctly into a Japanese context. For the freedom frame, the national 
trauma of wartime censorship and the importance of the post-war constitution give rise to 
many of the central arguments, most clearly the comparison to the wartime Peace 
Preservation Act and the frequent reference to fundamental human rights. Direct criticisms of 
the law as unconstitutional were also present in the material, but these did not appear 
frequently enough to be included as a representative device. 
For the security frame, the insulation of the Japanese society against an outside threat and a 
duty to fulfil expectations run as a clear culturally specific narrative. The security frame, 
influenced by Abe's rhetoric, is much concerned with the security of the Olympics, and the 
ratification of the TOC treaty. These are presented not only as a question of personal security, 
but also as a duty placed on Japan by the international community, and a matter of national 
pride to uphold. 
For both frames, the devices discussing the political debate are by both in context and content 
deeply linked to the long LDP dominance of Japanese politics, the difficulties of the 
opposition parties, the historical revisionism movement attempting to change the way Japan's 
wartime actions are viewed, and Abe's campaign for the constitution amendment. As such 
they provide deep insight into Japan's particular political situation, but are hardly 
transplantable to any other context. 
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7. Quantitative representations and analysis 
In this chapter, I will present the results of the quantitative analysis, covering the size and 
spread of the coverage in both newspapers, the presented frames, and finally the most salient 
devices for each frame and each newspaper, with the understanding that not every instance of 
referring to something is a framing device: for example, the duty to uphold international law 
comes up in contexts unrelated to the security frame. To calculate the salience of each frame 
in the text, I have counted the number of times each framing device occurs in an article. An 
expression that uses two devices is tallied in both. Recurring examples of this are the hijack of 
a plane carrying Olympics guests, evoking both the APOC's professed importance for 
counterterrorism and specifically for the Tokyo Olympics, and the tendency of politicians to 
combine references to human rights violation and constitution infringement into the same 
statement.  
The frame-making status of a negation became a question here. As a principle, I have counted 
the framing devices in statements by politicians and other actors with the opposing viewpoint 
from the article's primary one, unless the article proceeds to dispute them in the immediate 
context. Disputing one frame furthermore does not by itself count as invoking the opposing 
frame. Where a statement with one frame is immediately called to question with an opposing 
frame, I have only counted the latter. 
Some articles in both newspapers displayed no evidence of a frame being activated. These are 
most often short news notices or list-like descriptions of poll results. I have discarded them 
from further analysis. In Yomiuri, the number of disregarded articles is nine, and the final 
count of articles in the analysis is 88. In Asahi, there are 13 frameless articles, and 202 articles 
remain for the analysis. 
7.1 Size and distribution of the coverage 
With the discarding of the frameless articles, the difference between the size of Asahi's and 
Yomiuri's coverage gets even more drastic: Asahi devotes more than double the space that 
Yomiuri gives to the APOC. The size of the newspapers themselves is equal, so this is not a 
question of coverage being simply proportional to total size. 
As well as having a much larger coverage, Asahi's articles are significantly more varied. 
Table 2 shows the total counts of each of the five article types, as well as their median length 
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(in characters). This shows that Asahi's larger coverage is largely due to the amount of non-
news items they publish, while the number of news articles is comparable. Table 2 also 
presents percentages of each article type in the coverage, by item count and by proportion of 
total length. Comparing these numbers shows clearly the difference between Yomiuri's heavy 
reliance on news items and Asahi's more varied coverage. Almost 80% of Yomiuri's articles 
are in the news category, while the very low numbers in the interview and opinion categories 
in particular make meaningful comparisons in these categories difficult. However, the 
extensive length of Yomiuri's focus articles brings down the percentage of news in the 
coverage significantly.  
 
For Asahi, the differences between the different kinds of articles are less drastic. While 
Yomiuri's focus articles are significantly longer than Asahi's, the percentage of focus articles 
in the coverage is still in Asahi's favour due to the large number of them. Among other topics, 
Asahi ran a regular APOC focus series during the spring of 2017, where topics were posed as 
questions and answered as simply as possible. Another notable feature of Asahi's coverage is 
the high number and short length of the reader-submitted opinion pieces. Most of the articles 
in this category are reader letters with a wide variety of angles and a regular length of 400-500 
 Yomiuri Shimbun Asahi Shimbun 
Article 
type 
no. of 
articles 
average 
length 
% of 
articles 
% of 
length 
no. of 
articles  
average 
length 
% of 
articles 
% of 
length 
news 69 676 78,4 % 63,0 % 87 858 43,1 % 37,9 % 
focus 8 2049 9,1 % 22,1 % 39 1441 19,3 % 28,5 % 
interview 1 1083 1,1 % 1,5 % 20 1615 9,9 % 16,4 % 
opinion 2 1363 2,3 % 3,7 % 39 484 19,3 % 9,6 % 
editorial 8 901 9,1 % 9,7 % 17 883 8,4 % 7,6 % 
Total 88 841 100 % 100 % 202 975 100 % 100 % 
Table 2. Lengths and percentages of analysed articles by article type 
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characters as per the newspaper's specifications, and the median is brought further down by 
the occasional inclusion of reader-submitted haiku.  
Table 3 shows the articles arranged into brackets by length. The set length of the majority of 
Asahi's opinion letters inflates the second bracket, though it is also a common length for news 
articles that are not particularly in-depth. The medians of both papers' article lengths fall into 
this bracket, as do the medians of the news category. Overall, Yomiuri has proportionately 
more articles in the shortest category, but also in the middle one, while Asahi clusters heavily 
in the 400-800 bracket. The shortest articles in the whole material are Asahi's reader haiku, 
the shortest at a mere 29 characters, while the longest news article in Yomiuri clocks in at 
almost 5000, so the variance is significant. 
 Yomiuri Shimbun Asahi Shimbun 
-400 20 23 % 29 14 % 
400-800 32 36 % 82 41 % 
800-1200 26 30 % 36 18 % 
1200-1600  1 1 % 17 8 % 
1600- 9 10 % 38 19 % 
 
One of the main goals of this analysis was to examine what change appeared over time in the 
reporting of the APOC issue. To lay the foundations for the frame analysis in chapter 7.2, 
Figure 1 (split on the following two pages) introduces the number, length, and type of articles 
that both newspapers published during the examined period. The figure displays Asahi in 
shades of brown, Yomiuri in shades of blue, and each article type in a different shade. The 
length of articles and by extension each day's total coverage is indicated in characters.  
The figure clearly shows that the coverage is heavier towards the end of the examined period, 
when the APOC was debated the Upper House. In fact, the median date at which half of the 
total coverage had been published (by both number of articles and by total length) was May 
18th for Asahi, and May 20th for Yomiuri – in the latter case greatly affected by four of their 
nine longest articles being published on June 16th.  
 Table 3. Article counts and percentages by length bracket 
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The amount of coverage on June 16th, the day after the law was passed, is the largest in any 
single day of the examined period for both newspapers. Although over the whole period 
Asahi's articles average as slightly longer than Yomiuri's, on this last day Yomiuri's articles 
being longer than Asahi's makes the length of their coverage almost equal.  
Yomiuri's coverage stayed fairly even-sized until mid-June, its articles dotted one or two per 
day with empty days in between. On March 22nd, the first day of the coverage, there were 
four articles (one of them the aforementioned 5000 character one, which goes through the text 
of the law in detail), but this is the largest single day of coverage by article count until the 
latter half of May. Until May 20th, the only uptick in Yomiuri's coverage coincides with the 
start of the main discussion in the Lower House (April 7th). In May, the highest peaks follow 
a day after the passing of the law in the Lower House judicial committee and the Lower 
House itself, on May 20th and 24th. After the APOC enters the Upper House, Yomiuri falls 
back into its pattern of one or two daily articles until the end of the discussion. 
In comparison, the amount of articles not linked to the timing of new developments makes 
Asahi's coverage vary. This results in some peaks in the coverage that do not coincide with 
any significant developments. Such is the case in the first clear coverage peak which Asahi 
has and Yomiuri lacks, on the 18th and 20th of April. On these days, both newspapers report 
on  the same committee meetings in the parliament, and Asahi additionally publishes the 
results of a newly conducted poll. The content of Asahi's focus articles on these days is not 
related to any specific new developments.  
Asahi's next peak, May 5th, likewise consists of several topics unrelated to new developments, 
ranging from the interview of a police representative who advocates the security frame, to 
reporting the views of the United Nations lawyer who drafted the national legislation guide 
for signatories of the TOC treaty. This day falls on Golden Week, a string of public holidays, 
when the parliament was on break, and is the only conspicuous indication of Asahi timing 
non-news articles to keep the topic in people's minds when there was no news to report. In 
Yomiuri's case the opposite is true: all their focus articles coincide with news items and 
expand on those topics. 
Towards the latter half of the month, when Asahi's coverage begins to gain momentum, there 
is an increase particularly in the news coverage of the statements of opposition politicians and 
the popular protests that were picking up outside the parliament and around the country. This 
is coverage that Yomiuri either omits or covers in much shorter form. The increase in 
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opposition coverage explains part of the difference between Asahi and Yomiuri's coverage 
leading up to the Lower House vote on May 24th. 
A further explanation for the differences in coverage around this time is the different stance 
the newspapers took to Special Rapporteur Cannataci. Interestingly, while Cannataci 
published his open letter to the government already on May 18th, Asahi did not bring it up 
until May 21st and Yomiuri not until May 23rd. After this, Asahi brought up Cannataci's 
criticism frequently, including in an interview with him on May 26th, while all of Yomiuri's 
further mentions of the topic appear in the context of the government disputing his worries 
and criticising his involvement.  
Opposition, protests and Cannataci are the three main news topics that explain the difference 
in coverage size in June as well. June 15th, which is one of the days with the most drastic 
difference in coverage, is a wide display of highly opinionated content from Asahi. While 
Yomiuri keeps to a much shorter coverage, they also make space for two focus articles – a 
first since the opening of the parliament discussion. The topics and voices featured in the 
articles will be expanded upon in chapter 8.4.   
7.2 The frames 
This chapter will introduce how both newspapers transmitted the frames that appeared as 
dominant in the inductive framing analysis, and how this changed over time. The frames are 
presented in Figure 2 on the following page. The first number in each segment represents the 
number of articles, the second number their total character count. The different sizes of the 
two charts are proportional by character count. The articles are divided based on whether they 
only featured devices associated with the security or freedom frame, or whether devices 
associated with both frames appeared. As even a single mention of a contrary frame warrants 
putting an article in the "both" category, I will look at these articles in more detail later in this 
chapter to understand to what extent they were weighed towards one frame or the other.  
That Asahi's coverage leans on the side of the freedom frame is to be expected, with the 
newspaper's history of opposing the conservative government line and speaking up on issues 
perceived to be infringing on citizens' rights. Even so, the extent to which the freedom frame 
dominates this coverage – 154 articles transmitting only the freedom frame compared to only 
41 that evoke both frames – is surprising. Unforeseen, on the other hand, is over two thirds of 
Yomiuri's coverage being in articles that include devices from both frames. As Yomiuri is 
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usually a staunch supporter of Prime Minister Abe, this appears as far more neutral than 
hypothesised. The differing sizes of the total coverage mean that while Asahi's coverage in the 
"both" category is proportionally much smaller than Yomiuri's, it is actually longer in total, 
but even still the difference in percentage is staggering. The qualitative analysis in chapter 8 
will cover what these results stem from. The remaining Yomiuri coverage is heavily leaning 
on the security frame, and in both papers the coverage exclusively evoking their non-preferred 
frame is negligible and the individual article lengths in these instances very short. This places 
the papers directly opposed in their preference. 
  
 
 
 
Comparing the five article types and the dominant frames shows which article types were the 
most one-sided in their framing. Tables 4 and 5 on the following page illustrate these results, 
along with the average length of articles in each category. The percentage in the tables is 
calculated from the total length of that article type.  
  
Figure 2. Length and proportion of content by frame 
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Yomiuri Shimbun 
 
only security frame only freedom frame both appear 
articles %  
avg 
length 
articles % 
avg 
length 
articles % 
avg 
length 
news 26 32 % 573 3 2 % 279 40 66 % 773 
focus 2 17 % 1418 -- -- -- 6 83 % 2259 
interview -- -- -- -- -- -- 1 100 % 1083 
opinion 1 66 % 1811 -- -- -- 1 34 % 915 
editorial 5 50 % 721 -- -- -- 3 50 % 1201 
 Table 4. Yomiuri's coverage by frame and article type 
Asahi Shimbun 
 
only security frame only freedom frame both appear 
articles %  
avg 
length 
articles % 
avg 
length 
articles % 
avg 
length 
news 5 1 % 217 60 56 % 697 22 43 % 1443 
focus -- -- -- 27 64 % 1334 12 36 % 1682 
interview 1 2 % 741 15 75 % 1606 4 23 % 1866 
opinion 1 5 % 1026 36 85 % 445 2 10 % 916 
editorial -- -- -- 16 92 % 866 1 8 % 1157 
Table 5. Asahi's coverage by frame and article type 
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Table 4 shows clearly that Yomiuri's articles which evoke both frames are generally longer 
than the one-sided ones. This makes sense already from the simple consideration of space: 
articles that consider multiple viewpoints necessarily require more space for it than articles 
that only account for one viewpoint. The exception to this is the opinion category, but due to 
there being only two opinion articles, not many meaningful conclusions can be drawn. The 
majority of Yomiuri's news coverage evokes both frames, and even more clearly the majority 
of the focus articles. Editorials are the interesting exception: this is the category that most 
clearly transmits the newspaper's own opinion, and although by length Yomiuri's security 
frame editorials are equal to the editorials that evoke both frames, this is the only category 
where the security frame articles outnumber the bilateral coverage. The freedom frame 
coverage is negligible. 
Asahi's coverage is presented in Table 5. As with Yomiuri, Asahi’s articles where both 
frames appear are generally longer as well. The comparison of news coverage between the 
freedom frame and the articles where both frames appear is especially interesting. Although 
the number of news articles unilaterally evoking the freedom frame is almost three times as 
large as the number of articles evoking both, the latter are more than double in length on 
average, and so the length of coverage between these two categories evens out to 56% and 
43%. Nevertheless, Asahi's coverage is still significantly more one-sided than Yomiuri's. 
Asahi's much larger coverage in the categories that call for an opinion (interview, opinion and 
editorial) results in more space for potentially one-sided views than Yomiuri's almost 
completely news-focused coverage does, but inside these categories the tilt towards the 
freedom frame is astounding. Only one of Asahi's 17 editorials even mentions the security 
frame.  
Like Yomiuri's, Asahi's news articles that transmit the non-preferred frame are short enough to 
be two- or three-sentence notices. While Asahi’s one interview and opinion piece each in the 
security frame is a better representation than Yomiuri has with the freedom frame, their 
significance is low in comparison to the amount of interviews and opinion letters that only 
evoke the freedom frame. 
Looking at the overall frame weight, Asahi's coverage becomes even more heavily leaning 
towards the freedom frame. I have calculated the salience of each frame from the number of 
times devices were used, i.e. frames evoked, in the material. Chapter 7.3 will go deeper into 
the relative salience of different devices, but the totals are telling. As hypothesised, Yomiuri's 
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coverage leans in favour of the security frame with a 77 % majority of total devices used, 
while Asahi vastly favours the freedom frame with an astonishing 91 % majority. Within the 
articles that evoke both the security and the freedom frame, these numbers even out slightly, 
with 71 % in favour of the security frame for Yomiuri, and 78 % in favour of the freedom 
frame for Asahi. The newspapers' preferred frames are clearly dominant even when the other 
frame gains a mention. 
In addition to being more strongly leaning on one side of the frame pair in their coverage, 
Asahi also makes use of the framing devices more readily than Yomiuri. In other words, its 
coverage is more strongly framed overall. This is true even accounting for the difference in 
the length of coverage. On average throughout the period, Asahi mentions its preferred 
freedom frame once every 122 characters, or roughly eight times per article. For Yomiuri and 
the security frame, these numbers are one device per 144 characters, or just under six times 
per article. While these numbers are not too far apart, Asahi's significantly larger coverage 
means that the numbers of incidences behind them are Yomiuri's 513 total uses of a security 
frame device, versus Asahi's 1620 counts of evoking the freedom frame.  
In the use of the non-preferred frame the difference is more substancial. Yomiuri evokes the 
freedom frame 157 times in the material, once every 472 characters, but Asahi only touches 
on the security frame 152 times, which in their long coverage means only once every 1296 
characters, or less than one time per article. 
Adjusted for length of coverage, each paper stays remarkably even in how much they evoke 
their preferred frame throughout the examined period. The amount of devices used closely 
follows the length of the coverage. Yomiuri's use of their non-preferred freedom frame 
likewise follows in proportion to size throughout the period. In contrast, Asahi's use of the 
security frame stays uniformly small regardless of the length or number of articles. This plays 
a large part in the utter dominance of the freedom frame in Asahi's coverage. Due to the long 
coverage on June 15th and 16th, which only evoke the security frame nine times in total 
compared to the 320 uses of a freedom frame device, it also gives Asahi a slight tilt into 
increasing freedom frame dominance towards the end of the examined period. Yomiuri's 
freedom frame coverage is also at its largest on June 16th, but this is by far the paper's longest 
day of coverage, and the use of the freedom frame is in proportion to previous coverage.   
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7.3 The predominant devices 
This subchapter will introduce the most prevalent devices in the frame packages that the 
newspapers used. For both newspapers and both frames, only a few devices made up a large 
majority of the coverage. Equally across the board, the reasoning devices, which are used for 
defining the problem and its source and laying the blame, were among the most common. Of 
the framing devices, stereotyping the opposing side is particularly prevalent in both papers' 
dominant frames. After these, the devices building the reasons for the APOC are most 
predominant in the security frame coverage, and those taking up its consequences rise high in 
the freedom frame coverage. The next sections will go deeper into each newspaper and frame 
in turn. Refer back to Table 1 (pg. 40) for the overview of the frame packages, and to 
Appendix B for a complete list of how many times each device was used in each newspaper's 
coverage. Table 1 and Appendix B are not fully identical: some devices such as appeals to 
emotion do not appear independent of other devices and as such cannot be tallied 
individually; lexical choice, on the other hand, necessarily appears as a function of another 
device and has been excluded from the calculations in this chapter.  
7.3.1 Predominant devices in Yomiuri Shimbun 
In its security frame coverage, Yomiuri relies heavily on discrediting the opponents of the 
APOC and the government. Its three most common devices all revolve around this. At the top 
with 13 % of the total devices is stereotyping the opposition as contrarians who care more 
about opposing the government at every turn than the good of the people. The stereotype is 
followed by two reasoning devices identifying problem sources: the irresponsible or 
undignified behaviour of opposition politicians (10,6 %), and those politicians as well as 
citizens being genuinely misinformed about the contents and nature of the law (8,4 %).  
These three devices together account for almost 32 % of all the security frame devices used 
by Yomiuri. The following four, which together account for the next 27 %, are more focused 
on the direct issue of the APOC: the danger of terrorist attacks and other organised crime 
presented as a problem definition, the need to sign the international TOC treaty as a reason for 
the law, and stemming from these, the urgent passage of the law as a solution to the defined 
problem. These four are very close together in the number of mentions they get, ranging from 
35 to 27.  
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Only ten devices account for 75 % of all the mentions of the security frame in Yomiuri. The 
three remaining ones in the top ten cover roughly 5 % each. The government's careful 
explanation of the law is presented as a solution to the aforementioned misinformation 
problem, counterterrorism as a reason for the law, and finally the possibility to safely hold the 
Tokyo Olympics edges into the top ten as the most mentioned consequence of the law. The 
rest of the devices introduced in Table 1 receive between 17 and only two mentions in the 
coverage.  
If counterterrorism as a reason and the danger of terrorist attack as a problem definition are 
counted together, the combined mentions of terrorism just edge out stereotyping the 
opposition from the top spot with 60 combined mentions versus the stereotype's 59. However, 
tallying together devices that differ in their function but are very close in content will just as 
soon move discrediting the opposition back to the top spot, if the top two devices are counted 
together. 
Looking at the spread of different devices across the time period, there are two interesting 
features. The first of these is a clear clustering of the content-focused devices on certain dates 
– in late April, late May, and the last few days of coverage – while the devices used for 
criticising the opposition appear more evenly throughout the coverage. The content-focused 
clusters coincide with important dates in the parliament discussion, but it is interesting that 
criticism of the opposition carries as a constant thread through the coverage and indeed 
appears independently of any issue-focused devices.  
The other notable feature is a significant increase in all the predominant devices except the 
one emphasising the law's urgency on the last day of coverage. The omission of urgency as a 
device is understandable after the law was already passed. Most of the predominant devices 
reached their median day of incidences in the last week of May; for urgency this day was 
already the 19th of May, and notably for the misinformed opponents as a problem source on 
June 3rd, and the danger of other organised crime than terrorism only on June 10th. The 
danger of organised crime was mentioned nine times on the last day of coverage, compared to 
only 17 times in the preceding three months, which is an interesting anomaly. These 
incidences are also spread out across five different articles, so it is not a question of a single 
in-depth article concerning this specific thing.  
For the freedom frame, the smaller number of incidences makes the percentages behave more 
dramatically. Three devices make up half of all the mentions and another three bring it over 
  
55 
 
75 %. Surprising given Yomiuri's history as a supporter of Abe and his party is that a 
stereotype is again at the top spot: painting Abe as a despotic ruler makes up 21 % of all the 
times the freedom frame is evoked. It must be remembered that 21 % of the total is still only 
24 individual mentions; these are primarily quotes from opposition politicians.  
The second most popular device again strengthens Yomiuri's penchant for concentrating on 
the political strife over the issue at hand: authoritarian behaviour of the government (distinct 
of mentions of Abe in person) as a problem definition covers the next 15,8 % of total devices. 
However, the possibility of ordinary citizens being targeted by the APOC being defined as a 
problem is neck-to-neck with this, at 15 %. The remaining devices that gather more than 5 % 
of the total device use are surveillance society (9,6 %) and human rights limitations (7 %) as 
consequences of the law; vague criteria in the law text (8,8 %) and, linked to the previous two, 
the possibility of arbitrary investigation (8 %) as problems; and a moral duty for politicians to 
make meaningful debate (5,3 %). The rest gain scattered mentions; 13 devices are not 
mentioned at all.  
The freedom frame coverage is characterised by a significant increase in the devices 
criticising the government on June 16th. The median date of incidences of the despot 
stereotype is June 15th; with the criticism of the government's authoritarian behaviour and 
allusions to meaningful debate as a moral duty of politicians, it is June 16th itself. Particularly 
the criticisms of authoritarian behaviour are gathered in one article: a long news story where 
many opposition members and other critical voices are heard.  
7.3.2 Predominant devices in Asahi Shimbun 
Asahi, with its extensive coverage, would have much more space in which to introduce 
different devices. Yet, here as well it is ten devices of the dominant frame that make up 75 % 
of its total mentions. As with Yomiuri, the stereotype of Abe as a despotic leader is the largest, 
with 13,5 % of the total, or 179 individual mentions. Human rights limitations as a 
consequence of the APOC takes the second spot with 11,6 %. These two alone account for 
25 % of the total. Two problem defining reasoning devices, the possible targeting of ordinary 
citizens (9,7 %) and the government's authoritarianism (8,3 %) are next largest, and 
surveillance society as another possible consequence (6,8 %) takes the total to 50 % with only 
the five most predominant devices. 
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Another five devices make up the next 25 %. The first two of these are again problem 
defining: the vague criteria of the law text at 6,3 %, and the possibility of arbitrary 
investigation at 4,8 %. The inconsistency of the government's arguments as a source of 
problems is the next largest at 4,7 %. Comparison to the wartime Peace Preservation Act 
edges into ninth place just ahead of a proposed reason for the law: that the government wants 
to make it harder for citizens to oppose its future plans. These last two both measure 4,5 % of 
the total, but the comparison is mentioned 60 times and the reason 59 times.  
Due to the volume of Asahi's evocations of the freedom frame, even the minor devices still 
number in tens. The remaining devices range from 55 mentions (the complaint that the APOC 
is unrelated to terrorism, and the government is merely using that as a buzzword) all the way 
down to two (the suggested solution to reject the current proposal and try again later with 
better preparation and amendments).  
The majority of the predominant devices reached their median day of incidences between the 
18th and 25th of May, speaking for a heavy emphasis on the last quarter of the time period. 
The only exceptions are the worry for arbitrary application of the law, which reached its 
median already on the 5th of May, indicating that this device was more important earlier and 
fell to the wayside towards the end of the examined period, and the stereotype of Abe as a 
despot, which crossed its median on May 27th. The references to despotism are the only 
significant outlier in the spread of the coverage: they take an large leap upwards in the last 
two days of coverage, while the other devices stay in practically the same number of 
incidences during this huge coverage period as previously. The increase in these references is 
primarily due to one heavily critical editorial and interview on each of the last two days, 
which together account for 30 out of 66 mentions. Of the remaining devices, worries for 
human rights limitations and complaints of authoritarianism pull slightly apart from the rest.  
With its security frame coverage, Asahi is rather more focused on the issue over the 
accompanying political strife compared to what Yomiuri or Asahi's own freedom frame 
coverages have been shown to be. The top four devices, which together account for almost 
55 % of the security frame coverage, are focused on the APOC itself. Counterterrorism as a 
reason for the law is the most predominant at 19,3 % of the whole. Behind this number are 26 
individual mentions: in the much larger freedom frame coverage, a number like this would 
only merit a 16th place in the ranking. A second reason for the law, signing the TOC treaty, 
ranks second in the security frame coverage with 15,6 %. Third is a problem definition: the 
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danger of a terrorist attack (10,4 %). Safety of the Olympics as a consequence of the law 
ranks fourth at 9,6 %.  
Another three devices take the total to 75 %. These are two more problem definitions and a 
problem source. The irresponsibility of the opposition is the first strife-focused device, and 
comes fifth at 8 % of the total. Next is the opponents of the law being misinformed about its 
contents (6,7 %) and finally the insufficiency of the current law as a problem definition 
(5,2 %). Eleven more devices receive between five mentions and one, and five none at all.  
I initially feared that the small size of Asahi's security coverage would make it difficult to 
draw any valid conclusions about it, but interestingly this is the device set where a change in 
predominant devices throughout the period is most clearly visible. Three of the primary issue-
focused devices, counterterrorism, Olympics, and the danger of terrorist attack, cross their 
median in April or early May, meaning they are more heavily present during the first half of 
the examined period, while the complaint of the opposition's irresponsibility doesn't even 
appear until April 20th, the same day that two of the previous devices peaked, reaches its 
median on June 2nd, and is the only device that sees significant use on June 16th.  
7.3.3 Comparisons 
There was a significant overlap in both papers' predominant devices, much more so in the 
freedom frame. Although six predominant devices overlap also in the security frame devices 
(Table 6), their order is scrambled and Yomiuri's most predominant device, the opposition-as-
contrarian stereotype, does not appear in Asahi's list at all. Yomiuri's primary focus on strife 
devices and Asahi's foregrounding of issue devices is clear in how these have almost perfectly 
changed places in each paper's ordering. Only the danger of terrorist attack is similarly 
important in both framings. Yomiuri's 6th most predominant device, the risk of non-terrorist 
organised crime, is 8th place in Asahi's coverage, just outside of the percentage range that I 
have defined as the predominant devices, but the other devices that appear on each list are 
farther away from the predominant range in the other paper's coverage. 
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Yomiuri Shimbun  Asahi Shimbun 
opposition as contrarian  Counterterrorism 
opposition irresponsibility  TOC 
opponents are misinformed  danger of terrorist attack 
danger of terrorist attack  Olympics 
urgency  opposition irresponsibility 
other organised crime  opponents are misinformed 
TOC  insufficiency of current law 
government's careful 
explanation 
  
Counterterrorism   
Olympics   
 
 
There is a greater similarity in the freedom frame devices (Table 7). The newspapers share 
their most predominant device, the Abe-as-despot stereotype, and only the ranking of the 
worry for human rights limitations shuffles up the top seven. In that, though, the difference is 
significant, and it is interesting how much more Asahi brings the possibility of human rights 
infringement to the fore than Yomiuri. The vast difference in the number of times each paper 
evoked the frame likely plays a role here, as Yomiuri's use of the freedom frame is so small 
that the last device defined as predominant had a mere six individual mentions.  
The devices that do not appear on both lists are all on the bottom. Of these, the duty to hold 
meaningful debate appears lower on Asahi's list with 2,6 % of the total coverage, but of the 
ones Asahi used, only comparison to the Peace Preservation Act received a single mention 
from Yomiuri, the other two none at all.  
  
Table 6. Comparison of predominant devices in the security frame 
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Yomiuri Shimbun  Asahi Shimbun 
Abe as despot  Abe as despot 
government 
authoritarianism 
 
human rights limitations 
ordinary people argument  ordinary people argument 
surveillance society  government authoritarianism 
vague criteria  surveillance society 
arbitrary investigation  vague criteria 
human rights limitations  arbitrary investigation 
duty of meaningful debate  inconsistency of arguments 
  
comparison to Peace 
Preservation Act 
  
making it harder to oppose 
government 
 
The extent to which the devices concerning political strife dominated the coverage was 
surprising. Separating individual devices strictly into two based on whether they refer to the 
APOC itself or the political strife surrounding it is both impossible and meaningless, given 
especially Asahi's strong tendency to use the conduct of the government as a reason to fear 
what the government would do with the law, but I want to compare the most clearly strife-
focused devices with the rest, as well as criticism of the government and the opposition with 
each other.  
For the security frame, the clearly strife-focused devices are the opposition-as-contrarian 
stereotype, the accusation of irresponsibility, and three devices from lower down the list: 
accusing the opposition of using delay tactics, the government's concessions as a solution, and 
the visual device of showing disorder in the parliament. I have left out the devices related to 
misunderstanding and explanation, as misunderstanding can be genuine and not necessarily 
related to political disorder.  
Table 7. Comparison of predominant devices in the freedom frame 
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For the freedom frame, I have counted the Abe-as-despot stereotype, accusations of 
government authoritarianism, and making it harder to oppose the government as a reason for 
the law as the pure strife devices. This is a conservative decision, but criticism of the 
government and criticism of the APOC are deeply intertwined in the freedom frame, and 
these are the devices most clearly separate from a criticism of the law. 
 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 f
ra
m
e 
 
 
F
re
ed
o
m
 f
ra
m
e 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of strife focused and other devices in the coverage 
Figure 3 above demonstrates the percentages. The blue and orange segments always mark the 
amount of direct criticism of the opposing side – of the opposition in the security frame, and 
of the government in the freedom frame.  Yomiuri's greater emphasis on political strife is clear, 
as is Asahi's security frame focusing more on issue-specific devices. It is the freedom frame 
 Yomiuri Shimbun Asahi Shimbun 
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coverage that truly surprises. The first of them is that Asahi's coverage is less critical than 
presumed. The wording of some of Asahi's editorials especially is truly venomous, and the 
impression one brings away from their coverage is more critical of the government than a 
mere quarter of the devices would imply.  
The true surprise is Yomiuri's freedom frame coverage being the most critical of all. It is 
possibly explained by Yomiuri's preference for reporting mostly news of parliament 
happenings, where uncommented statements from the opposition – naturally inclined to 
critique the government to the media – could account for the use of these devices. However, 
that does not explain the lack of other devices in proportion, because opposition members 
would just as naturally want to spread their own viewpoint. It must be remembered that 
although the percentages show that Yomiuri is more critical of the government in what 
freedom frame coverage it has, that coverage is very small, and Asahi's smaller percentage 
hides over 300 more incidences. 
Figures 4 and 5 on the next page demonstrate how each newspaper's criticism of the 
government and the opposition changed over time. The most notable feature here is the 
massive increase of criticism of the government in the last two days of coverage, even in 
Yomiuri. Yomiuri also increased its criticism of the opposition, with the peak on the 15th, but 
the rise in government criticism is unprecedented. The amount of times Yomiuri criticises the 
government only surpasses their opposition criticism twice during the time period: both of 
these, on April 2nd and May 5th, are single articles where a politician expresses their 
disapproval of a decision of the LDP.   
When viewing the Asahi chart, the difference in scale in comparison to Yomiuri's must be 
kept in mind. The amount of times Asahi criticises the government on the 15th and 16th of 
June is unprecedented and incomparable to anything in this dataset. In comparison, Asahi's 
criticism of the opposition is almost too small to measure, although it too peaks on the 16th, 
only much lower. 
The two newspapers most clearly show their sides in the upticks that occur throughout the 
examined period, which coincide almost perfectly. The only difference in these small peaks – 
on April 7th, May 20th and May 24th, which coincide with important dates in the discussion – 
is which side of the debate the newspaper chooses to criticise. In addition to the shared peaks, 
Yomiuri has a significant increase in opposition criticism on May 10th that Asahi does not 
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mirror. Behind this is one of Yomiuri's leading editorials on the subject, which is one of its 
most strongly framed articles when looking at devices per length, and uses nine of its 13 
devices – all pertaining to the security frame – to criticise the opposition. 
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8. Qualitative analysis 
This chapter will move away from dissecting the details and take a step towards the bigger 
picture to look at those features of the coverage that cannot be adequately analysed with 
numbers alone. As the preferred frames of the newspapers are so clearly divided, a 
quantitative comparison of their devices can only go so far. In this chapter I will first give an 
introductory description of both newspapers' coverages, expanding on the previous chapter 
but also introducing features that could not be covered in a quantitative inquiry. Chapter 8.3 
briefly covers thematic and lexical similarities, as well as the secondary frames that saw 
intermittent use in both papers, but primarily this chapter is concerned with analysing the 
features that set the two sources apart.  
Based on the quantitative analysis, the central features turned out to be agenda management, 
the choice of what to consider as worthy news to report and who these choices benefit; the 
allocation of voice and credence to the various partisan actors involved in the conversation, 
and the ways their trustworthiness was emphasised or questioned; emotional themes, of 
interest because both newspapers largely evoked the same emotions, but for entirely different 
reasons; and the use of particularly evocative terminology as opinion management. On the 
other hand, grammatical agency, which I had been prepared to analyse, did not offer much of 
interest. These comparisons make up chapter 8.4. 
8.1 Overarching features of Yomiuri's coverage 
Yomiuri's coverage is most clearly characterised by its focus on the events of the parliament 
discussion. The conflict is portrayed as being between the government and the opposition 
parties, and the emphasis is placed on disorder and delays in the parliament. The news 
coverage, which accounts for a majority of the material, is largely void of journalist 
commentary, reporting parliament developments and the accompanying partisan frames with 
an air of direct transmission. This gives the news articles an outward air of strict neutrality 
and accounts for most of Yomiuri's freedom frame content as statements from the opposition 
are transmitted without commentary.  
However, Yomiuri's choices of terminology and particularly reporting verbs carry experiential 
and expressive values which are geared to evoke agreement with the government at the 
expense of the opposition. Yomiuri uses the government's preferred name "terrorism 
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preparation crime" and habitually introduces the APOC as a law that "makes organised crime 
punishable at the planning stage", clearly tying it to crime prevention with its terminology. 
This and a repetition of the law's "strict parameters", a government mantra, are examples of 
building a catchphrase memory by associating counterterrorism, organised crime and strict 
parameters for enforcement as key concepts of the APOC. In addition to word choices, 
Yomiuri primarily frames by agenda-setting: by deciding what is reported, who is heard, and 
which angles are omitted entirely. These features are central to the analysis, and will be 
examined in-depth in chapter 8.4. 
One feature that appears more prominently in the coverage than it came across in the 
quantitative is the expressed urgency of the APOC. Although it featured as only the fourth 
most common device of the security frame, it is emphasised in a qualitative inquiry: one of 
the main reasons both the government and Yomiuri itself criticise the opposition is their 
irresponsibility in delaying the law. The importance of the law and the danger of terrorism is 
first emphasised, then the opposition can be implied to care more about opposing the 
government at any price necessary than protecting the citizens from terrorism.  The tendency 
noted in chapter 7.3 of the opposition criticism carrying as the constant throughout the 
examined period, with other devices clustering on dates when something significant happened 
at the Diet, is largely due to the news consisting of reports of the opposition delaying the 
discussion on the days when the discussion made no significant progress. The bulk of this 
criticism is pointed towards the Democratic Party, the largest in the opposition, while the 
other three parties that opposed the APOC are hardly mentioned.  
Yomiuri's emphasis on political life means its articles cover several topics of focus that Asahi 
did not touch on at all. These all deal with political manoeuvring. In the first two weeks of the 
examined period, Yomiuri gave significant attention to a rift between the LDP and Kōmeitō, 
the two government parties, regarding the timing of the APOC proposal in the parliament. 
LDP wanted to give priority to the APOC over two previously delivered proposals which 
according to parliament custom should have been discussed first, while Kōmeitō wished for 
the customary order to prevail. This disagreement was solved with a compromise, and 
Yomiuri moved on.  
The Tokyo local elections, upcoming in July, appeared as a frequent reason for the APOC's 
urgency, portrayed by Yomiuri as the underlying true cause as to why the government wanted 
to rush the law through legislation: to avoid the possibility of unpleasant press fresh in 
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people's minds during the campaign period. These allusions increased as the debate dragged 
on and extending the parliament session was speculated. Yomiuri also kept a constant tab on 
how much time would be required to process the law and what day it might be expected to 
pass, bringing timing and the importance of political tactics further to the fore. 
In accordance with its heavily politically focused style of coverage, Yomiuri's use of images 
in the articles is sparing, and mostly focused on portrait-like pictures of politicians speaking 
in parliament or committee. The devices relating to opposition unruliness are reinforced with 
images of disorder in the parliament twice, and on June 16th one image of the protests outside 
parliament is included. In tables collecting the APOC's central points, terrorism is illustrated 
with explosions and shadowy figures with evil smiles.  
Yomiuri's use of sources outside of the parliament press conferences and directly quoting the 
discussion is even sparser than its use of images. Three police representatives and five legal 
experts give comments in favour of the security frame in the longer focus articles, all but one 
in the last two days of coverage. Once on May 20th and twice on June 16th, short comments 
from interviewed protesters make up the entirety of the paper's outside-sourced freedom 
coverage. The only interview in the material is with the retired police chief who was in charge 
of the Aum Shinrikyō sarin attack investigation in 1995, who has the gravitas to speak of the 
importance of cracking down on crime in the planning stage.  
8.2 Overarching features of Asahi's coverage 
As has become evident in chapter 7, Asahi's coverage of the APOC proposal was prolific and 
with widespread criticism of the government. It had also begun significantly before the 
introduction of the proposal in the parliament: Asahi ran a focus article series on the topic 
since February, when the proposal was initially presented to government parties for 
commentary. This means that Asahi's attitude and many of its favoured devices were well in 
place by the time the parliament debate started, and may have played a part in setting the 
opposition's agenda. 
From the start Asahi opted consistently for "anti-conspiracy bill" in talking about the law and 
its regularly repeated description phrase was "a law proposal which incorporates the spirit of 
the anti-conspiracy bill that crimes will be punished at the planning stage"
vii
, later also "a law 
that could limit human rights"
viii
 
ix
. Although both newspapers' descriptions included the gist 
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that planning a crime would become punishable, the angle is very different. Further, Asahi has 
a tendency to write the word "anti-conspiracy bill" in white on a black background in its 
headlines, dramatically boxing the word in to catch attention. This is akin to writing in capital 
letters in an alphabetical language. 
Unlike Yomiuri, which concentrated on the political conflict in its coverage, Asahi heavily 
emphasises a popular protest, the government against the people. The opposition plays an odd 
role in this, placed on the side of the people but not as a part of it. Asahi groups itself squarely 
with the people. This is a central feature that carries subtly across the coverage, from 
comment columns on the side of news articles that brings the journalist’s opinion forward, to 
a large amount of reader letters, to a thematic emphasis on ordinary people's doubts and 
worries, to extensive protest coverage always using the organiser's estimate of the participant 
count. The use of markedly informal language in editorials, to emphasise social closeness 
with the reader by using relational values of grammar, is also notable. Another, subtler 
grammatical feature that Asahi uses to emphasise that the law is the ordinary citizen's problem 
is the question form:  
"Isn't this becoming an informant society?"
x
  
"Won't there be investigations that invade all the way into people's  
           inner thoughts?"
xi
  
"How far will society cast the eye of surveillance?"
xii
  
Phrasing worries as questions coaxes the reader to subconsciously answer them and therefore 
to form an opinion. As people are by nature more likely to approve of their own ideas, 
triggering an opinion-forming reaction could be a powerful tool in directing public opinion if 
the collocation of the question and Asahi's heavily framed coverage can affect that opinion. 
This is a stark contrast to Yomiuri, which writes in declarative sentences, simply stating its 
version of the truth. This difference could be seen as a mirroring of the government's and 
opposition's positions in the debate: the government is in a position of control, repeating 
declarative statements, the opposition is imploring them to consider the problems they see, 
but powerless to make a difference as long as the government holds their position. 
Another interesting detail of the language used is Asahi's occasional lapse into modalising its 
claims by attributing them to an anonymous group of worried observers, such as "suspicions 
that [the law] might violate freedom of thought are deep-rooted"
xiii
 and "many citizens' 
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apprehensions have to do with not only the law itself, but deep distrust towards a government 
that calls white black"
xiv
. The latter example is from a leading editorial.  
Alongside and often linked to the citizen resistance, the other main theme that runs in Asahi's 
coverage is the government's questionability, which was also clearly visible in the quantitative 
analysis. Asahi is particularly prone to using criticism of the government as a reason to 
oppose the APOC. Criticism of the law's contents is focused on the possibility of its misuse 
against citizen activists, doubt is cast at the government for proposing a law with such 
possibilities, and criticism of the process is used as final proof that a government that would 
bypass due legislative process cannot be trusted to not misuse the law. Framing Prime 
Minister Abe as a would-be despot is Asahi's preferred angle of approach, and the picture of 
the government obstinately refusing to discuss the opposition's worries falls right into this line. 
Abe is often used as the symbol of his entire administration: this explains part of the emphasis 
on the despot stereotype, as dislike of the entire government is personified into Abe. The 
despotism angle emphasises the power gap between the government and other actors. The 
narrative Asahi builds is a classic but powerful one: the underdog against a powerful foe, 
opposition against the monolith wall of an authoritarian government, the people shouting 
outside the gates. The latter is shown literally, as Asahi's coverage includes 13 pictures of 
protesters, with a marked emphasis on protest pictures taken after dark, stressing the direness 
of the situation. 
The extensive coverage of protests is one feature that sets Asahi apart from Yomiuri, which 
mentioned the protests very briefly. In addition to citizen demonstrations and statements of 
opposition from various non-governmental organisations, Asahi brings attention to a trend of 
local politicians from different parts of Japan sending letters to the parliament, primarily to 
urge for careful discussion. Recalling past and recent wrongdoings by the government or 
police, a device brought in by Asahi's reader letters, is taken up and expanded as a succession 
of cautionary tales used to illustrate why the government's assurances that the law will not be 
misused cannot be trusted. These tales stretch from the persecution of the "unpatriotic" in 
wartime, to very recent cases of the police investigating citizen organisations like they were 
criminal suspects.  
Asahi's varied articles give it a wider range of non-parliament sources than Yomiuri. 
Statements from people interviewed at protests are very common. Of particular note is also a 
series of focus articles where the pen is handed over to notable people in the fields of 
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literature, art or law to give their views on the APOC. These articles are often florid in their 
defence of the freedom frame, especially when written by people whose livings depend on 
full freedom of speech and publishing, who tend to view the APOC as one step in a continued 
process towards limited citizen freedoms under Abe.  
In counterbalance to its emphasis on grassroots resistance, Asahi readily brings in legal 
experts, both academics and practicing lawyers and judges, to give weight to its views. The 
views of these legal experts are overwhelmingly in favour of the freedom frame, which 
suggests some care in the choice of interviewees on Asahi's part. Two legal experts and two 
police-affiliated sources are quoted in favour of the security frame, as are some reader letters. 
In an interesting parallel to Yomiuri's interview with the Aum Shinrikyō investigator, Asahi 
interviews the public prosecutor who was in charge of the case. In contrast to the investigating 
detective, he does not believe the APOC could have prevented the attacks, simply due to a 
lack of any forewarning whatsoever.  
The emphasis on popular resistance is Asahi's main journalist frame. Frequent comparison to 
the wartime Peace Preservation Act is also a device that does not stem from the parliament. It 
was present already at the very start of the examined period, alluded to in an editorial on 
March 22nd. Like Yomiuri, Asahi also takes up and expands on many features from partisan 
frames. The selection of particular reader letters for inclusion is already an example of taking 
up a partisan frame, and Asahi frequently expands on reader-submitted topics in later articles.  
8.3 Similarities and secondary frames 
Despite their often directly opposite angles and opinions, Yomiuri and Asahi also have some 
clear similarities in their coverage. The most obvious of these is the shared use of terminology 
evoking a war frame and a game frame in description of political discussion. Describing 
politics in terms of a battle or a game is generic in political reporting, but Yomiuri goes a step 
further in this, once illustrating the means that the opposition has at its disposal to delay the 
passing of the APOC as a literal hand of playing cards
xv
. These secondary frames emphasise 
the political strife angle of the reporting, but do not appear commonly enough to be 
considered codominant. 
In all the focus on political strife and placing the blame on different sides, one of the only 
things Yomiuri and Asahi seem to agree on is their mutual dislike of Justice Minister Kaneda, 
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whose wavering and repetitive answers to committee questions were considered unhelpful to 
the discussion. This far Yomiuri and Asahi are in agreement, but their reasoning for why 
Kaneda's behaviour earns their criticism reflects their frames of choice. Yomiuri disapproves 
of Kaneda's inability to justify the law to the opposition and the people, fearing that a poor 
orator is hindering the support for an important law; Asahi holds Kaneda's inability to explain 
the law sufficiently and the repeated contradiction of his own and ministry officials' 
statements as proof that the APOC is badly conceived and should be voted down or at least 
thoroughly reworked. Yomiuri calls for Abe to question if Kaneda's talents would be best used 
somewhere else
xvi
; Asahi holds Kaneda's purported inability as indicative of Abe's 
incompetence
xvii
. 
On a more practical level, a structural similarity that often appears is a question and answer 
format in explanatory articles. This is a format that especially Asahi, with its many focus 
articles, prefers. In addition to being simple to understand at a glance, the power of the 
question format is in the newspaper's liberty to define the question and thus to define the 
problem. Discussing the APOC's necessity, Yomiuri phrased its question as "why is it 
necessary?"
xviii
, while Asahi asks "is it necessary?"xix. Another way Asahi uses the power of 
the question-answer format to subtly influence is exemplified in its 教えて!共謀罪 focus 
series ("tell me about the anti-conspiracy bill!"). The questions in this series are formulated in 
informal language, and give an air of being genuine questions by regular people, 
strengthening Asahi's theme of ordinary people's worries.  
8.4 Comparisons of major distinguishing features 
This chapter is divided into four subchapters, concentrating on four key areas that illustrate 
the differences between Asahi and Yomiuri's framing and the reality they choose to forward. 
Some features commonly considered significant in Western linguistic scholarship, such as the 
use of passive or active voice in assigning blame and responsibility, did not carry particular 
significance in this data. This is partially due to the structures of the Japanese language, but 
partially also to the realities presented by the newspapers being so far apart from each other 
that an analysis of finer grammar details would not have yielded any new information. 
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8.4.1 Whose agenda? 
As discussed in chapter 4.2, selecting certain features for increased salience and others for 
exclusion is a key part of framing. This is a utilisation of agenda setting power, one of the 
most powerful tools at a newspaper's disposal: the power to influence what people think about 
and talk about by influencing what they know about. Chapter 7.3 analysed at length which 
features the newspapers decided to emphasise, and so this subchapter is primarily concerned 
with the origins of the emphasised features. 
In the case of the APOC debate, the agenda setting power of the newspapers is somewhat 
lessened by the fact that the topic they are reporting is a parliament discussion, and hence the 
total omission of the main parties' arguments, let alone the whole discussion, would be too 
obvious. The parliament, therefore, sets the topic, but the newspapers fully engage in 
managing the direction of its coverage by emphasising some features at the expense of others. 
Yomiuri's emphasis on political manoeuvring and Asahi's on popular protest are clear 
examples of this. Coming from outside the main discussion that both papers report, these 
sides of the issue, both equally true, receive disproportionately different coverage. 
An important question is where the centralised topics originate from. Yomiuri's emphasis on 
political strife is there from day one, introduced by the opposition with such dire phrasing as 
"do-or-die resistance to the bitter end"
xx
 and immediately picked up and carried by Yomiuri. 
Although the opposition is the origin of this feature, it does not benefit from it: rather, the 
opposition's sharp rhetoric was one of the main targets of criticism from both Yomiuri and the 
government. Yomiuri also echoes the government's emphasis on urgency and becomes its 
primary propagator, tying together the strife and urgency devices as a reason to criticise the 
opposition's behaviour. Thus the emphasis of these devices comes out benefiting the 
government, and specifically the LDP, which was behind the urgency angle.  
Asahi reproduces the same warlike opposition statements, but limits its references to political 
manoeuvring to quotes from politicians given in parliament press conferences. Yomiuri, 
which dedicates several articles to the description of political drama alone, is more 
consciously nudging the agenda towards strife with its topic choice. Asahi is also quick to 
insert its opinion of the government's untrustworthiness, so the strife discussion benefits the 
opposition by portraying it as righteously resisting the oppressor. While criticism of the 
government also originates from the opposition, this is a device that Asahi emphasises in its 
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editorials. So do the majority of opinion letters and interviews. This is part of why criticism of 
Abe tops the list of frequent devices in Asahi's coverage: it comes in from all directions.  
Given how Asahi's coverage of the APOC started well before the parliament discussion and 
the examined period, it is difficult to determine to which extent Asahi is the originator of the 
devices it centralises. The emphasis on the same arguments as the opposition uses and 
centralisation of the failings of the government benefits the opposition parties, but Asahi also 
criticises the opposition – primarily for ineffective arguing.  
While many of Asahi's arguments coincide with those of the opposition, it also introduces 
features not covered in parliament. The emphasis on protest coverage is Asahi's own. 
Although ultimately Asahi portrays the protesters as powerless, they are also a partisan actor 
in the conflict and their cause benefits from the space given to it. At the same time, Asahi 
benefits from portraying ordinary citizens publicly agreeing with the arguments it has pushed.  
The majority of truly original arguments, however, come from Asahi's rich and varied reader 
letters and interviews. These include, among other things, the entire material's only references 
to the freedom of religion
xxi
 
xxii
 and the freedom of association
xxiii
. Although these are 
primarily in defence of the freedom frame, they also include the most sincere defences of the 
security frame that Asahi's coverage has, such as a letter from a reader who lived under 
significant terrorist threat in Kenya
xxiv
. Asahi's security frame coverage is interesting in that 
despite being so small, it is formed out of multiple sources: reader opinions, interviewees 
primarily in the police or the field of law, but also in literature, as well as government 
statements in parliament.  
The larger amount of outside-sourced content such as interviews in Asahi's coverage would 
point to comparatively more partisan framing in Asahi, but the reverse is true. Despite the 
scarcity of outsider sources in the material, the majority of Yomiuri's framed content comes 
from partisan sources, and overwhelmingly this source is the government. The percentage of 
government-originated content is inflated precisely because Yomiuri rarely allows any opinion 
from outside the parliament into its coverage.  
In particular Yomiuri's ways of talking about the APOC itself are set by what the government 
puts forward. In defence of the law, Yomiuri solely employs devices that the government has 
introduced, including in its editorials. Naturally, this arena given to its arguments furthers the 
government's cause. The only argument that Yomiuri originates in the whole discussion is the 
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worry that including stricter limitations on the law could limit its usability. This device is first 
brought up in an editorial on the first day of coverage
xxv
, and later echoed by the police 
interviewee
xxvi
. 
The freedom frame content likewise comes almost uniformly from the parliament, in this case 
as quotes from politicians outside the LDP. The only feature of the freedom frame that 
Yomiuri spreads actively is the criticism of the government's handling of the debate, which it 
views in editorials as unhelpful to the goal of spreading further understanding. Much of this 
criticism is directed towards Justice Minister Kaneda. Interestingly, criticism of Kaneda is a 
device that comes from multiple sources: Yomiuri's first mention of it comes from 
government party Kōmeitōxxvii, but it is also taken up on the same day in the same editorial as 
the usability question. The way the criticism is phrased, however, does not benefit the 
opposition, who argued relentlessly against Kaneda. As Yomiuri's criticism hinges on the 
worry that Kaneda's subpar performance would hinder the passage of the APOC, it does not 
agree with the opposition's reasoning. 
The one issue where Yomiuri truly takes a stance against the government's agenda appears at 
the very end of the coverage period. The government's decision to bypass the Upper House 
judicial committee with a full house vote drew criticism from parliament and Yomiuri alike. 
Reactions to this decision from all sides explain the peak in government criticism in the last 
two days of Yomiuri's coverage. The passage of the APOC was effectively decided with this 
decision, so the only damage to the government from the backlash is reputational.  
The newspapers' different agendas are visible with curious clarity in their choice of which 
target crimes of the APOC to foreground. Yomiuri uses serious violent crimes such as murder 
and plane hijacking as its regular examples, emphasising the importance of the APOC for 
security. Asahi, meanwhile, picks its examples from the crimes whose inclusion was criticised 
for being tangentially related to organised crime at best: copyright infringement, stamp 
forgery and, most prominently, illegal foraging in a nature reserve. Their handling of the 
opposition's statements is similarly polarised, only mirrored. Asahi includes statements that 
foreground the opposition's frustration with the law and the government, emphasising the 
government's lack of cooperation; Yomiuri chooses opposition statements that emphasise their 
arguments' repetitiveness and discredit their concerns.  
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Agenda management by omission is the primary way Yomiuri uses its power to influence. 
Rather than offer opinions, it presents a curated reality as the truth, and implies the 
insignificance or nonexistence of other views by omission. Its emphasis on political drama 
does not invite citizen discussion: the issue is presented as belonging wholly to the realm of 
politics, and while its leading editorials on the subject are opinionated, they also endorse the 
politicians' agency, urging the government and opposition by turns towards better 
negotiation
xxviii
 
xxix
.  
Asahi manages less by omission and more by discussion and commentary: despite what the 
overwhelming percentage of freedom frame dominance would imply, it is not that Asahi fails 
to publish the government's statements on the topic. Rather, it has a pronounced tendency to 
immediately call these statements to question with the reply of an opposition member or a 
callback to an earlier contradiction. This brings the agenda back to a government-opposed 
view. The regular reliance on an opponent's reply as the last word of the article or a 
"however" segue into an earlier government statement that contradicts what was just quoted 
explains why the numbers were so clearly in favour of the freedom frame: as being 
immediately contradicted stops a device from building towards a frame, a large amount of 
potential security frame devices in Asahi's coverage were simply discounted. It also accounts 
for my impression as a reader of Asahi's extreme criticism of the government. 
8.4.2 Voice and credence 
The last chapter touched on the importance of voice for agenda setting. Which parties get to 
speak their truth naturally influences the resulting frame greatly. However, being heard and 
reported is by itself no guarantee of being able to spread a preferred agenda: a voice only 
matters if it is also given credence, reported in such a way as to not discredit the speaker. In a 
dataset such as this that largely echoes partisan frames, the credence given to the sources 
becomes a central feature of journalist origin. This chapter will delve into the lexical and 
grammatical features used to evoke trust and distrust in the various partisan actors involved in 
the debate. 
The first of these features is the choice of reporting verbs in the direct quoting of politicians' 
statements. The choice of a neutral verb such as "says" or one with a negative experiential 
value such as "claims" makes a big difference in the credence of the statement, even if the 
message itself is transmitted word-for-word.  
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For both papers, the majority of reporting verbs used are of neutral value. Where they part 
from this baseline, a familiar divide emerges: Asahi's loaded verbs point the blame at the 
government, Yomiuri's at the opposition. The difference is especially clear when each paper's 
preferred party is presented in the same context with a neutral or positively loaded verb. In 
Yomiuri, the government "emphasises", while the opposition "insists" xxx , in Asahi the  
government "touts"
xxxi
, "fixates on" their point and "repeats", while the opposition 
"requests"
xxxii
, "points out" or "voices concern"
xxxiii
. Interestingly, both sides tend to use the 
exact same verbs, only pointed at opposing parties.  
Illustrating the nature of the parliament debate, variations of "repeat" are the most popular 
negatively valued reporting verbs. These references increase in frequency towards the end of 
the examined period, as the debate ground more to a halt in the parliament, but Asahi refers to 
the government's "repeating yet again" as early as April 20th
xxxiv
. Yomiuri refers to the 
opposition with "keep repeating" in May
xxxv
 and June
xxxvi
, Asahi to the government again at 
the end of May
xxxvii
, and goes as far as "obstinately repeating" by the end of the time 
period
xxxviii
.  
In addition to verb choice, Asahi has a pronounced tendency to provoke doubt towards the 
government's words by reporting it as second-hand information. Instead of reporting the 
importance or necessity of the APOC as a simple qualified statement, Asahi hedges with "the 
government says it is important for counterterrorism"
xxxix
, "Abe is explaining that it is 
important for counterterrorism"
xl
 or "the government is portraying it as necessary"
xli
. 
Although unwaveringly critical of the opposition parties throughout, Yomiuri varies more in 
how it places its sympathies in relation to the two government parties: during the early weeks 
when the LDP and Kōmeitō were having a disagreement on preferred procedure, Yomiuri first 
reported the Prime Minister as "asking for cooperation" and Kōmeitō as "insisting"xlii, then a 
week later LDP "pushing over" Kōmeitō to "jump into" a votexliii. 
This kind of loaded descriptive language is one of the central means used to credit or discredit 
the parliament actors. The material has some staggeringly strong wording for a newspaper 
dataset, and only some of it comes from quoted partisan actors. Yomiuri calls the opposition's 
arguments "extreme" and "fanning citizens' fears" repeatedly in editorials
xliv
 
xlv
, in addition to 
quoting the government's statement about the opposition as "antagonising with excessive 
measures"
xlvi
 and an expert interviewee's remarks about their "one-sided extreme 
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arguments"
xlvii
. Similarly, Asahi repeatedly refers to the government's "obstinate insistence" 
on the truth of their arguments
xlviii
 
xlix
. Both Asahi's editor and the Democratic Party refer to 
the government's handling of the debate as "coercive", "trampling principles"
l
 
li
 and "walking 
over the rules"
lii
, and a reader opinion adds on "contempt of the parliament"
liii
.  
Colourful description of the parliament debate appears throughout the time period and on all 
sides. Yomiuri describes the opposition's actions variously as "refusing to compromise"liv, "a 
revolt"
lv
 or "deplorable"
lvi
, but also describes the government's final interim report measure to 
end the debate as "reckless" and "chipping legality"
lvii
. Especially earlier in the examined 
period, Asahi occasionally implies the government is having trouble handling the debate, such 
as the repeated reference to their answers as "see-sawing"
lviii
, with the government "trying to 
run away" while the opposition "thrusts at problem points one after the other"
lix
, or increasing 
the participation of a bureaucrat in the committee "to pull through"
lx
, linking to Minister 
Kaneda's problematic replies. Both newspapers refer to Kaneda as "dodging answering"
lxi
 
lxii
, 
and Yomiuri additionally as "monotonous, incoherent and inconsistent"lxiii. 
Asahi's reader opinions and interviews are the source of many very direct comments on the 
law and the government. The previously referenced opinion letter additionally calls the 
current political situation a "crisis caused by the indolence of rulers". One interviewee, fearing 
for the freedom of citizen movements, asks whether the APOC might not "accelerate the 
tendency to throw people who are judged deviant to the wolves"
lxiv
. One of the subtler and at 
the same time most damning lexical choices comes from a historian interviewed by Asahilxv, 
who compares the actions of Abe's government to that of pre-War Japan, especially their 
reactions to international criticism, and equates the two subtly by using identical verbs in her 
descriptions of their actions.  
Agenda setting overlaps with credence where the actions of one side or the other are chosen 
for inclusion and described in ways that are likely to evoke either disapproval or sympathy, in 
an attempt to change the reader's opinion of the described actor and thus their likelihood to 
believe their arguments. Both newspapers engage in such emotive description, though in 
vastly different contexts.  
Yomiuri, true to its emphasis on strife in the parliament, primarily saves dramatic description 
for mentioning undignified behaviour of opposition members. Raised voices and disorder in 
committee meetings are described as "throwing sparks" and "uproar as opposition members 
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surrounded the chairman's seat"
lxvi
 and again a month later as opposition members "resisted, 
taking papers from Chairman Suzuki, pinning his hands"
lxvii
. Asahi covered the description of 
this latter event with "yelling" and opposition members "approaching" the chairman's seat
lxviii
.  
For Asahi, the emotion evoked most often is sympathy, and the targets of that sympathy are 
the protesters and activists taking a stand against the law. Describing the frustration, fear, and 
sadness of regular people evokes sympathy to the individuals and through them to their cause. 
In the same article as the committee meeting just described, an interviewed protester is 
described as "shedding tears". By June, tears have given way to "sighs and bitter smiles"
lxix
 in 
in a demonstration where people read the transcript of the parliament discussion out loud to 
bring attention to how little relation there is between the questions and answers, although 
protesters in this event describe their concern as well. Since the law that got pushed back to 
make time for the APOC was meant to strengthen the punishments for sex crimes among 
other things, Asahi's editor calls for sympathy for the victims who are being made to wait for 
justice, among other things describing rape as the "murder of the soul"
lxx
. Stories from the 
victims of wartime censorship or recent police misconduct are also frequent for evoking 
sympathy and fear.  
Opinion on the integrity of the police forces is a clear divider between Asahi and Yomiuri. 
Asahi brings up recent cases of mismanaged investigations from the first day lxxi , and 
continues to introduce victim stories from people who were either falsely accused and made 
to confess after hundreds of hours of interrogation
lxxii
 or simply found out that their lives had 
been combed for information after participating in citizen activism
lxxiii
. Yomiuri brings up the 
police forces mainly in the context of them giving their approval to the law
lxxiv
 or voicing 
worry that the law's requirements will be too limiting to fully make use of
lxxv
. The two 
referenced articles also touch on the concern Asahi voiced so prominently, the first with a 
police representative's assurance that investigators will work closely together with the 
prosecution to ensure the legality of investigations, and the second features a jab at the 
opposition, saying that their objections rely on the supposition that all police are crooked.  
Another notable difference in the credence the two newspapers give to a partisan actor is in 
their handling of the United Nations rapporteur Cannataci. While a general tendency to 
respect and credit legal and academic authority runs equally in both, the credence they give to 
Cannataci is starkly opposite. After Cannataci published his letter to Abe on May 18th, 
neither paper reacted until the 21st, when Asahi ran a focus article introducing the contents of 
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the letter in detail. Since this introduction, Asahi referenced Cannataci frequently and 
respectfully, including granting him first-hand voice in an interview on May 26th, and 
criticised the government's angry response to the authority of a United Nations official. In 
contrast, Yomiuri does not mention the letter at all until it reports the government's criticism 
of it on the 23rd. Yomiuri continues to solely mention Cannataci in the context of the 
government criticising his "clearly inappropriate"
lxxvi
 letter and questioning his credentials
lxxvii
. 
As Yomiuri only reports the government's words about Cannataci, the only voice this gives 
him is a short summary of the letter's contents in its introductory article on the subject.  
8.4.3 Emotional themes – duty, shame and fear 
Fear appears at the core of both the security and freedom frames. There is fear for safety in 
the data, intertwined with the danger of terrorism, and fear for the loss of freedoms, in the 
name of safety but for the benefit of a heavy-handed government. At the core, these are both 
fears for a different kind of safety – that of bodies, and that of minds.  
Keeping on its chosen track of not mincing words about the APOC, Asahi talks about fear 
much more often, and much more overtly, than Yomiuri. Asahi begins to build a sense of 
unease about the APOC from the very start, with several references to "the danger of the law 
intruding into freedom of thought"
lxxviii
 in the main introductory article alone, and a direct 
comparison to the Peace Preservation Act in a journalist comment on the same front page
lxxix
. 
Fear enters the discourse slowly, first as formal references to the opposition's "fear that the 
law could infringe on constitutionally guaranteed rights"
lxxx
 or as an interviewee's "fear that 
citizen groups could become targets of infiltration"
lxxxi
, amid similarly phrased worries for 
civil liberties and the safety of activist groups. These repeated references build up a 
catchphrase memory of worry and fear as a logical and appropriate response. 
The tone of the debate begins to shift towards the latter half of April, when Asahi turns to 
notable people in the artistic fields for their views on the APOC. Journalist references to the 
uncomfortable implications of the APOC and the polite worries of politicians remain, but it is 
the author and artist interviewees who introduce the truly florid language into the discussion. 
Dramatic figures of speech such as Japan "on the edge of a dark vortex"
lxxxii
 or "dangerously 
close to the point of no return"
lxxxiii
 paint a vivid picture of the APOC as a danger that should 
be truly feared and resisted, else it would lead the country down a path to war. An atmosphere 
where civil activism withers and the government does not even have to implement any formal 
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censorship, since the people are too afraid of being watched to do anything, is one of the most 
commonly voiced fears
lxxxiv
 
lxxxv
. Increasingly towards the end of the examined period, fear 
starts appearing as a theme in the reader opinions as well, all the more effective for being 
voiced in the simple words of everyday people: from the 92-year-old who remembers war 
censorship with "I know that fear in my bones"
lxxxvi
, to the high schooler who starts her letter 
on June 16th with a simple "I am really scared right now."
lxxxvii
 
Compared to the veritable deluge of fear references that Asahi brings out, Yomiuri's ties to 
fear as a device are much weaker and less overt. This comes partially from the overall lack of 
opinion material, but Yomiuri's newswriting is also less open to emoting than Asahi's. 
Yomiuri's use of fear is entirely tied to the threat of terrorism device, evoking fear by 
emphasising the necessity and urgency of protective legislation, and the unique horror of 
terrorism among crimes.  
Aside from occasional references in an editorial to "protecting ourselves against the violence 
of international terrorists"
lxxxviii
 or "citizens falling victim to international terrorism"
lxxxix
, 
Yomiuri's emphasis on the dangers of terrorism that citizens must be protected against comes 
from various quoted partisan sources. Again, the primary source is the government. Abe
xc
 and 
Kaneda
xci
 refer to recent terrorist attacks in Europe repeatedly in the Diet, once memorably on 
the day after the Manchester concert bombing
xcii
. Several references are made to Daesh by 
name. One specialist interviewee also begins their statement with "terrorism, which creates 
countless victims even among other crimes, is especially important to prevent"
xciii
.  
The safety of the Tokyo Olympics is a particular repeated theme. The people responsible for 
the security are reported in the previously referenced article to be welcoming the APOC, 
while one of Yomiuri's few reader opinion letters admits to "feeling great anxiety over Japan's 
counterterrorist measures as the Olympics are drawing near"
xciv
, and Yomiuri itself ties these 
two threads together as "terrorism keeps occurring in the west, and the threat is getting more 
severe in Japan as well as we prepare for the Olympics"
xcv
.  
Between Yomiuri's own repeated references to "international" terrorism, the repeated use of a 
hijacked plane carrying guests for the Olympics as an example of the sort of crime the APOC 
targets, and government politicians' reference to specific incidents in Europe, the emphasis is 
heavy on foreign threat that Japan must be protected against. The government's foregrounding 
of the law's necessity for the TOC treaty is likely linked to this. 
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While fear is universal, the other two emotional themes that run in the material appear almost 
stereotypically Japanese. All participants in turn appeal to a sense of duty and a sense of 
shame – duty to the people, to society, to future generations, to the international community, 
and shame for not performing those duties to standard. What differs is the view of what this 
duty entails, and what actions are bringing the much feared scorn. The main points of this 
difference were introduced in the frame matrix in Table 1 (page 40). 
Both frames designate duties primarily to politicians as legislative actors, and secondly to 
Japan as a national entity. Asahi, additionally, makes occasional reference to the duty of the 
press to act as watchdog to power. In the freedom frame, the principal duties of politicians are 
to protect the rights of citizens, and to make meaningful debate. The latter duty is notable 
firstly for the concentration of its incidences towards the end of the discussion period and 
secondly for being one of the freedom frame devices to appear in Yomiuri to any significant 
effect. Both papers refer to it in editorials on June 16th
xcvi
 
xcvii
. 
In Asahi's coverage, the duty of politicians to protect the rights of citizens runs more as an 
undercurrent reason as to why the opposition should fight against the passage of the APOC 
than word-for-word references to duty, such as opposition statements that the APOC 
"concerns freedom of thought, so we will oppose relentlessly"
xcviii
. The duty of Japan as a 
nation to comply with international human rights standards appears heavily intertwined with 
this especially after United Nations Rapporteur Cannataci enters the discussion. Although 
most of the discussion skirts around the word 'duty' with phrasings like "as politicians we 
must", some direct references do also appear. One of them is a Kōmeitō member's reference 
to the duty of the diet to prevent broad interpretation of the law
xcix
, which is surprising as this 
device is primarily used by and in defence of the opposition. An opinion piece from a reader, 
who recounts recently visiting an exhibition on the development of democracy in Japan, calls 
for the opposition members to show the same backbone as the politicians that came before 
them
c
.  
In the security frame, the primary duties of politicians and Japan as an entity are largely 
intertwined into the same references. The duty to protect citizens' lives and public order is 
presented as the reason for Japan’s duty to ratify the TOC treaty. These devices originate, 
again, from the government's rhetoric. Many of Yomiuri's uses of them come from quoted 
statements, but the duty to ratify the TOC is also brought up in editorials, urging the 
government to finally ratify the treaty it initially signed 14 years ago
ci
.  
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It speaks of how much the government emphasised the TOC and international crime as a 
reason for the law, that the duty to protect comes up almost exclusively in connection to the 
Olympics. Abe brings the device into the debate with a reference to the duty of a host country 
to prevent the threat of terrorism in the Olympics
cii
, and Kōmeitō likewise refers to the "self-
evident duty" to protect arriving visitors
ciii
. An expert brought into a committee hearing in 
May, whose statement Asahi includes, is the first to refer to "safety and peace of mind for our 
country"
civ
 without making reference to the Olympics, and he too connects that safety to the 
TOC. Only after the law is passed does Abe talk about enforcing it "appropriately and 
effectively to protect the lives and livelihoods of citizens"
cv
, a statement that was quoted 
widely on that day. 
The security frame's preoccupation with the TOC treaty is further reflected in the ways it 
evokes shame. This is the shame of not being up to standard with international law, and of 
having spent 14 years between the signature and the ratification of the treaty, such as in the 
previously referenced editorial. Part of the emphasis on urgency is carried over from this: the 
shame of being among the last 11 nations who have not ratified the treaty – especially among 
such company as Somalia and South Sudan, as Yomiuri's editor points outcvi – is brought up 
even by the Prime Minister
cvii
, and starting from the very first introductory article
cviii
. 
In the freedom frame, the shame that is evoked is for not being up to another kind of 
international standard – that of human rights. Particularly, this device comes up around late 
May, after Cannataci published his letter. In other words, the shame is not so much in not 
being up to standard, but in the possibility of receiving criticism for it from outside the 
national debate. A Democratic Party member quoted in Asahi on May 24th refers to 
Cannataci's criticism as "very disgraceful for a constitutional state"
cix
, and Asahi itself voices 
worry that Japan's human rights efforts will come under questioning from the United Nations 
after Cannataci's report, while opining that Abe's government has been overly sensitive to this 
kind of criticism in the past
cx
.  
8.4.4 Words of power 
In a focus article on the first day of coverage, Asahi calls the government's use of the name 
"terrorism preparation crime" for the APOC a "conspicuous example of public opinion 
management"
cxi
. This quote illustrates the subject of this final chapter: the uses of highly 
evocative terminology that I call words of power. This is not merely ideologically loaded 
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lexical choice – these are words loaded with so much importance that their inclusion 
automatically evokes strong emotions, whether for or against. The use of powerful 
terminology can be, as Asahi shows in the example above, accused of being populist or 
propagandising, somehow substandard for fact-based public debate.  
This is a feature of the discussion that both newspapers accuse their opposing side of relying 
on. Asahi likes to point out that the government is doing "an impressive show of image 
manipulation"
cxii
 by waving around words like 'security' and 'counterterrorism' that "make 
people stop thinking"
cxiii
, while conveniently neglecting to mention that 'fundamental human 
rights' and 'surveillance society', some of the opposition's favoured buzzwords, are also such 
terms. Yomiuri's editor, for his part, names the opposition's 'fearmongering' as the problem in 
the debate, and tells them to prove their point with factual arguments instead of "crying 
'surveillance society'"
cxiv
. 
'Freedom' and 'security' as concepts are already themes of high emotional impact. They are 
both examples of what Nisbet (2010: 47) calls "frames that resonate with an audience's 
strongly held 'perceptual lenses'": in other words, frames that make strong feelings about 
another issue relevant. In this case, the relevance is that of deep personal freedoms or physical 
security to a law proposal in parliament. It follows that these should be greatly effective 
frames, and it also follows that tying other strong feelings to the issue with further word 
choice should sink the offered frames in deeper.  
Words of power function as the bridge between the text and the receiver's emotions. These are 
the words that are used to evoke the fear and shame discussed in the previous chapter, the 
words that paint the picture of a petulant opposition or a despotic government. The most self-
evident of these is the ideological load associated with the different names used for the APOC.  
Yomiuri introduces the APOC as a reintroduction of Prime Minister Koizumi's 'Anti-
conspiracy Act' with new, stricter requirements, and reports that the Abe government has 
chosen the name 'terrorism preparation crime' to emphasise that the law's purpose is for 
counterterrorism
cxv
. From then on, Yomiuri consistently refers to the APOC by the 
government-given name. All of its uses of 'anti-conspiracy act' refer to Koizumi's proposal, 
and appear in the context of comparing the APOC favourably to the old proposal. The only 
exceptions to this in the entire material are direct quotes from those opposing the law. Tying 
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the very name of a law to a fear-evoking word of power, such as terrorism, transforms the 
name into an efficient and constant reminder that the law is necessary for security. 
Meanwhile, Asahi opens with the above quote on conspicuous opinion management, and 
includes a notice in its main introductory article that since the law includes the gist of the 
'anti-conspiracy act', Asahi will continue as a principle to use that name, and the government's 
preferred term will be used "when necessary"
cxvi
. In practice, the name "terrorism preparation 
crime" appears either in direct quotes from proponents or in the context of a second-hand 
referral such as "the government is using the name 'terrorism preparation crime'". 'Anti-
conspiracy act' is a loaded term not strictly because of its meaning, but because of the history 
the term carries in Japan. Using the name of a thrice-rejected proposal ties the APOC to that 
proposal and the arguments and fervour that were used to oppose it, dismissing the 
differences that the law's proponents emphasise. Whether one considers Yomiuri's or Asahi's 
choice the marked formulation depends entirely on the decision whether to trust the 
government's or the opposition's side of the issue.  
Beyond the naming question, Asahi's larger and more emotionally involved coverage gives, 
again, a greater variety to the freedom frame's vocabulary, while the security frame 
concentrates on a few choice terms. Terrorism and counterterrorism are a pair of words that 
invited significant discussion in the parliament, as the opposition accused the government of 
using terrorism as a banner to rally citizens behind, while the spirit of the law was unchanged 
from before
cxvii
. Asahi joined in on this criticism, among other things calling the name change 
"changing clothes"
cxviii
, "smoke and mirrors"
cxix
 and a "facelift"
cxx
. The JFBA also commented 
to the same effect
cxxi
. An interviewee, who was prominent in the protests against the security 
guarantee law, gives their words on the effect of the name 'terrorism preparation crime' very 
clearly: "It is viscerally difficult to oppose something with 'counterterrorism' in the name. I 
will sit this one out."
cxxii
 In this sense, the name appears to have worked as Asahi claims it was 
intended.  
In reply to the opposition's various accusations, the government's reaction was to accuse the 
opposition of fearmongering
cxxiii
. Although what drew the most attention in the parliament 
was Abe saying this in a radio show in June and refusing to withdraw his statement, this line 
of argument was actually introduced by Yomiuri, who referred to the opposition "purposefully 
fanning citizens' anxieties" repeatedly in editorials
cxxiv
 
cxxv
. Framing objections to the law as 
deliberate political manoeuvring rather than genuine concern plays into the choice of casting 
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the opposition as contrarians who care more about opposing the government than protecting 
the people. 
Even more than accusing the government of opinion management with the constant emphasis 
on terrorism, those opposing the law used other words to highlight the direness of their cause. 
The most common of these eye-catching words is 'human rights', which remarkably often 
appears as the full phrase 'fundamental human rights' or 'the rights of citizens'. Peppering 
articles with these powerful words, especially together with high-intensity verbs such as 
'violate' or 'infringe' may be due to a genuine concern about rights violations, but it is also a 
powerful tool that builds a phrasal memory and a worry, even fear, in anyone who considers 
human rights important. 'Constitution' also becomes one of these words of power in the 
Japanese context, due to the cultural importance of the post-war constitution and especially its 
pacifist Article 9, and Abe's long-standing goal of abolishing that article along with modifying 
the rest of the constitution. 'Constitutionally guaranteed human rights' is therefore a double 
punch phrase of power for the regular Asahi reader, who is statistically likely to oppose 
constitutional revision. 
Another interesting example of an outwardly neutral but culturally loaded word choice is 
'enforced vote', the parliamentary measure that the government used to bypass the Upper 
House judicial committee to vote on the law in the plenary session. Although 'enforced vote' 
is in theory a technical term, referring to a vote decided by the chairman in a situation where a 
parliamentary committee cannot come to a decision that a vote should be held, it also refers to 
steamrollering in a more generic sense, and it is therefore no surprise given the newspapers' 
preferred angles that 'enforced vote' is specifically Asahi's primary term of use. While Asahi 
also appends 'enforcement' to other nouns describing the government's actions, Yomiuri uses it 
exactly twice in the whole material, both times directly quoting an opposition politician.  
In addition to referring to 'human rights' in general, the opposition and Asahi use 'freedom of 
thought'. In this case the Japanese word choice carries an eye-catching connotation that the 
English does not convey: the regular term for freedom of speech is 思想の自由 (shisō no 
jiyū), but in this context the common option is 内心の自由 (naishin no jiyū). Shisō means 
'thought' or 'ideology', but naishin means 'inner thoughts' or 'innermost heart'. The extra 
emphasis on one's very inner core being "rudely barged into"
cxxvi
 by the government paints a 
vivid picture. It is interesting that this specific phrase appeared from the very beginning of the 
debate period and comes from multiple actors, including Asahi and interviewed specialists. 
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Further research into the time period before the start of the parliament debate would be 
necessary to determine when the connection of this specific phrase to the APOC was made, 
and by whom.  
The theme of fundamental rights violations does not stop at the word 'rights'. One of the most 
popular words of power, especially noticeable in the parliament debate but equally used by 
Asahi's journalist content and interviewees, is 'surveillance society' and variations. Asahi uses 
"the terror of surveillance" in a headline on the first day of coverage
cxxvii
, and the word 
appears near-daily especially in May and June. The invasion of privacy is a severe threat, 
especially in a country like Japan with a history of totalitarian governance in living memory, 
as proven by Asahi's eleven reader letters that recount and reference the horrors of wartime 
thought police. The Peace Preservation Act, itself a word of power due to the singularly 
negative connotations it evokes in the collective Japanese consciousness, is a popular point of 
comparison to the opponents of the APOC, but stands out as a word of power used 
significantly less in the parliament and more by interviewees and opinion writers, possibly 
due to it being a too direct accusation to use against the government from the opposition.  
In context and presented as a result of surveillance society, the 'withering' of civil society and 
civil activism is a conspicuously common word choice. It first appears in an expert interview 
on March 22nd
cxxviii
, is picked up by a Communist party member in the Lower House
cxxix
, and 
appears remarkably often in the interviews of authors and activists.  
The theme of authoritarian governance continues in the wide and varied references to the 
purported despotism of Abe and his government. Beyond 'surveillance society' and 'Peace 
Preservation Act', this theme is less concentrated around a single word of power, but no less 
lacking in emotive examples. References to the destruction of democracy become popular in 
Asahi's coverage towards the end of the discussion period, with such standout language as 
"hollowing out constitutionalism and furthering a turn to dictatorship"
cxxx
, "the parliament is 
dying"
cxxxi
, or "democracy stands on the edge of a cliff"
cxxxii
. The APOC is referred to as 
"Abe's ultimate weapon"
cxxxiii
 and parliament debate as "a barren ceremony"
cxxxiv
. An Asahi 
staff member makes the paper's opinion on Abe and the APOC absolutely clear on June 16th 
with a headline that straddles the line between evocative and theatrical: "This is democracy 
laid to waste."
cxxxv
  
 
  
85 
 
9. Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis has been to examine how two majority newspapers at different ends of 
the political spectrum report the same parliament discussion when the issue at hand is highly 
polarising. Identifying and describing the frames that Yomiuri Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun 
use to portray the APOC law proposal itself, as well as the accompanying discussion in the 
parliament, was the key target of examination.  The examination also covered the ways in 
which they transmitted partisan sources involved in the discussion, as well as the extent to 
which they disputed those sources or supplemented them with other information, and which 
main linguistic means they used for that purpose. In order to do this, I performed a hybrid 
framing analysis followed by a supplementary qualitative analysis using tools from critical 
discourse analysis. 
The primary frames identified in the analysis are a security frame and a freedom frame. The 
security frame emphasises that the APOC is important for counterterrorism and the 
ratification of the international TOC treaty. It stresses the threat posed by terrorist attacks and 
the duty of Japan as a future Olympic host to maximise security. In the parliament discussion, 
the security frame portrays the opposition parties as political schemers and places the blame 
of the debate's lack of progress on them.  
The freedom frame foregrounds the concerns that the APOC poses a danger to civil rights. It 
emphasises the law's wide scope and vague wording leading to the possibility of ordinary 
citizens being targeted by terrorist investigations, and suggests that the government is 
purposefully aiming to set up a surveillance society. The government is portrayed as either 
authoritarian or incompetent, and the stereotyping of Prime Minister Abe as a despotic leader 
is particularly prominent.  
Conservative Yomiuri primarily used the security frame in its coverage of the APOC. It took 
the government's side in its extensive coverage of the strife in the parliament, but also 
criticised both the opposition and the government for what it considered to be poor debating. 
Yomiuri's writing was characterised by the uncritical transmission of partisan sources, with 
the government overwhelmingly featuring as the main source. Sources from outside the 
parliament discussion were scarce.  One particular feature was Yomiuri's concentration on the 
urgency of the law, for both security reasons and more prosaic concerns of political 
manoeuvring. Yomiuri's editorials argued in favour of the security frame, but primarily 
followed the government's set of devices without offering anything new to the discussion. Its 
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use of experientially or relationally loaded language was sparing, and primarily concentrated 
in word choices that discredited the opposition.  
The liberal Asahi used the freedom frame almost exclusively. It transmitted both the 
government's and the opposition's statements, but commonly disputed the government's words 
and criticised their handling of the debate. Asahi also introduced partisan sources from outside 
the parliament, with a heavy emphasis on the coverage of popular protests against the law. 
Asahi's language was much more expressive than Yomiuri's, evoking fear for the state of civil 
rights and distrust in the government with lexical and grammatical choices.  
Based on my knowledge of the parliament discussion, I had hypothesised the appearance of a 
security frame and a freedom frame in the newspapers, and the hypothesis was also correct in 
which newspaper supported which frame. This was more a presupposition than a true 
hypothesis: the papers' political alignments are well known. Further, I hypothesised that both 
newspapers would primarily transmit partisan frames from the parliament uncritically, 
signifying a lack of investigative reporting, and that Asahi would cover the anti-government 
protests in a positive light, but Yomiuri would omit them entirely. 
This was only partially correct. The hypothesis that the newspapers would mainly transmit 
partisan frames without comment was only true for Yomiuri. While Yomiuri's focus on 
transmitting the events of the parliament discussion without commentary or extra sources 
makes it seem quite neutral on the surface, its agenda management and lexical choices clearly 
benefitted the government at the opposition's expense. Therefore it cannot be said to have 
been uncritical, though the criticism that does appear is hardly related to investigative 
reporting. Yomiuri did also cover the protests, though only briefly, and even included several 
statements from interviewed protesters.  
Meanwhile, the hypothesis was entirely off regarding the criticality of Asahi's coverage. Asahi 
hardly transmitted the government's partisan frame without critical commentary, and while it 
was more sympathetic to the opposition, they also received some criticism. However, the 
criticism of partisan sources was limited to the criticism of those in the parliament, with very 
few exceptions. In this, Asahi's ability to choose its own interviewees likely affects its 
willingness to criticise them. Despite the critical tone, Asahi's coverage also does not show 
significant evidence of true investigative journalism. Asahi does include regular and in-depth 
explanatory articles of the APOC and its possible uses, so it is possible that the lack of 
investigative reporting may be rather due to the nature and timescale of the issue than a lack 
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of investigative power. Asahi's protest coverage was positive as hypothesised, however also 
even larger than expected, with an unforeseen emphasis on government-critical reader letters 
and intelligentsia interviews.  
One completely unexpected feature of the coverage was both of the newspapers' heavy 
emphasis on the description of political strife over the nature of the law proposal itself. It was 
natural that this would come up, but I had expected the greater part of the newspaper 
discussion to concentrate on the law and its possible consequences, with the political 
manoeuvring in the parliament running as a side topic. Instead, especially Yomiuri placed the 
political strife at the centre of the agenda and the APOC almost as a separate topic. While the 
devices centred on the security angle outnumber the devices centred on the strife in Yomiuri's 
coverage, the qualitative analysis emphasised the strife elements. Both the opposition and, to 
a lesser extent, the government were portrayed as having concerns that had more to do with 
an upcoming election than the law proposal being discussed. With the heavy emphasis on 
politics, it is debatable whether security was Yomiuri's primary frame at all, because it is 
debatable whether the APOC was Yomiuri's primary topic at all. Additionally, almost all of its 
devices for the security frame come from the government, so the motivation behind Yomiuri's 
framing may also be less an endorsement of security and more a simple endorsement of the 
government.  
However, Yomiuri's editorials are heavily in favour of the security frame, and one of its few 
journalist-origin devices is the criticism that the proposal may not be strict enough. This 
would speak for security being the primary frame of the APOC. I made the conscious decision 
at the inductive coding stage to consider the description of political strife a part of the 
freedom–security frame pair: I still stand by this decision for the same reasons, as even 
Yomiuri, with its greater emphasis on strife, still constantly links the strife back to the APOC. 
Furthermore, foregrounding the strife so significantly could speak of a conscious attempt to 
background its contents – to erase the law's problems by giving them low salience.  
Asahi's coverage of the political strife was more clearly linked to the freedom frame, as 
government authoritarianism is a central danger in the freedom frame, and Asahi was able to 
use the strife in the parliament to frame Abe's government as dangerous in this way. However, 
Asahi's chosen frame may be just as politically motivated as Yomiuri's: its belligerent history 
with Abe Shinzō has left it with little love for the LDP and its recent politics, and a clear 
current of distrust in the authorities – LDP, Abe himself and the police alike – runs across its 
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coverage. Trust or distrust in the authorities is both a features of these frames and a 
prerequisite for using them.  
Based on these features, it can be concluded that slant, as defined by Entman, is quite evident 
in both newspapers. Security and freedom may be the frames, but supporting or opposing of 
the government is the slant. Complete ignorance of one side's angle was neither paper's 
preferred way, but both paid very little attention to non-parliamentary partisan groups that did 
not support their preferred frame. In the parliament, however, derogating the opposing side 
was the rule rather than the exception. Yomiuri may give voice to opposition politicians 
without direct comment, but at the same time its coverage heavily emphasises the opposition's 
petulant irresponsibility, so how much credence can such a voice carry? Asahi, for its part, 
primarily reproduces the government arguments only to question them.  
Entman does not mention how long a slant has to hold up to be considered a content bias, but 
the consistency of both newspapers' preference over a period of almost 90 days leads me to 
call this a content bias, especially considering that both newspapers are in accordance with 
their stated political alignment. This last fact means that likely a capitalist bias is also at work 
behind the decisions of what to report and how to frame it: both newspapers are catering to 
their expected audience. Without interview or survey based research it is impossible to truly 
determine whether the bias that appears is a conscious choice, because as Entman noted, 
favouring one side can also be a result of that side delivering their message more skilfully, but 
in a case like this, it is likely that the reporter's own political opinions also affect their 
decision-making bias, and therefore which side's arguments they consider more convincing.  
Another evident bias in the material is a significant watchdog bias for Asahi, with its focus on 
the past wrongdoings – and the fear for future ones – of government and investigative 
authorities alike. An interesting detail in this focus is how much of it comes from reader 
letters and the interviews of activists, lawyers and historians. Asahi is at liberty to choose its 
outsider sources, so it cannot be said that the distrust of authorities comes organically from 
citizens, but the frequent inclusion of their worries certainly helps Asahi emphasise its angle 
that the APOC is a problem that concerns everyone. By contrast, Yomiuri's framing portrays 
the topic as wholly belonging in the realm of politics. 
Even discounting interviewees and opinion writers who are free to air their personal views, 
the colourfulness of the newspapers' language was surprising. Asahi's editorials in particular 
contain some truly venomous turns of phrase, the bulk of it aimed at the government. In 
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newswriting as well, Asahi's vocabulary and grammar have been shown here to carry 
significant experiential value. The traditional ethos of journalism is that the news are neutrally 
presented fact and the paper's opinion only comes across in editorials; while Asahi keeps its 
direct opinions out of news articles, the chosen angle and the tone of the language certainly 
carries it. In comparison, Yomiuri's writing style is on the surface far more neutral and 
opinions are kept to editorials. However, Yomiuri too slips loaded vocabulary into its 
descriptive language and reporting verbs.  
However, Yomiuri frames rather by omission than by loaded vocabulary. Asahi's framing is 
overt and active, declaring opinions and including a journalist frame of popular resistance, but 
Yomiuri keeps to more neutral language, declarative sentences, and the partisan frames 
originating from the parliament. The output could even be described as neutral at first glance, 
but a closer look at the extent to which the security frame dominates in the coverage, as well 
as how much criticism of the opposition dominates the security frame, reveals the truth. 
Yomiuri's framing is subtler than Asahi's, functioning by the omission of other angles rather 
than by the active propagation of the favoured one, but it is there. 
The differences in the coverage of parliament events – the exact same source – show that 
careful selection of which facts to include, exclude and emphasise makes a vast difference in 
the output. Although reading either Asahi or Yomiuri a reader could be quite content that what 
they are presented with is reality, looking at both of them side by side unveils the forces at 
play. This is the power of framing: it is almost as if reading reports of two entirely different 
incidents. The difference in the two newspapers' political stances is not just merely apparent 
in their language, it is there in the very reality that they choose to report. The target reader 
groups of Asahi and Yomiuri are very different, so this gives a worrying idea of how different 
the realities offered to different segments of the Japanese population are. It is more than likely 
that newspaper subscribers get their news from more than one source, but how will this one-
sided framing affect the way they view those other sources? And how do those other sources 
affect their view of the reality offered here? 
What is not visible in the results, even though the background of Japanese journalism had led 
me to expect it, is any evidence of kisha club interference in the reporting. There is very little 
overlap in the contents, topics or timing of the articles beyond the coverage of the parliament 
developments, no oddly identical wordings without a public source, and no evidence of both 
newspapers avoiding a particular angle. This may speak for the declining power of the clubs, 
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but it may also simply be due to the topic being an active parliament discussion, meaning that 
a significant primary source was completely public.  
This material gives a bipolar view on whether the agenda-setting power of Japanese 
journalists is indeed weakened and the freedom of press diminishing, as is the common belief 
in literature. Asahi's coverage is varied and includes a wealth of sources, and their primary 
frame is in direct opposition to the government: this would point to a significant amount of 
liberty remaining. At the same time, Yomiuri relies almost completely on partisan devices, 
and most of those devices come from the government: there is little journalist foray outside 
that which is provided by the parliament. Asahi's loss of the investigative reporting section 
has clearly not completely taken its edge off, as it appears unafraid of political backlash from 
negative framing – or, perhaps, it is counting on political backlash benefiting its own image as 
a watchdog in this situation. Yomiuri's lack of contrasting viewpoints could be the paper's 
genuine choice, or could be indicative of Yomiuri taking extra care to preserve "neutral and 
unbiased" reporting by avoiding opinions that contrast with the government. The evidence of 
this research is not sufficient to make conclusions about this. The reasoning behind the 
newspapers' framing choices was not a target of inquiry and would have been impossible to 
research with these methods, but interview or survey based research into the journalists' 
reasons for their framing choices is a very interesting future option.  
Given Asahi's spirited opposition of the government, George Mulgan's and Nakano's worry 
that the liberty of the Japanese press is already a thing of the past appears overrated based on 
this data. However, although this material would suggest that the press are at liberty to report 
what they wish, absence of evidence in a single case study is not evidence of absence in 
society at large, and looking at the themes in Asahi's coverage and its reader-submitted 
content, at least a subsection of Japanese society certainly feels the oppressive atmosphere 
that was referenced so much. Thus I cannot agree with Cucek's criticism of Abe's critics either. 
Based on this research, I find myself most in agreement with Yamada, fearing for an 
oppressive atmosphere in society more than formal censorship.  
This research has identified the frames used in the newspaper coverage and detailed their 
structure and most predominant devices. For this purpose the method as I have modified from 
van Gorp's model works quite well, and should be repeatable to anyone who is interested in 
making an in-depth framing analysis. Its greatest limitation is the inherent subjectivity of 
framing: although this method has been calibrated as precisely as possible to minimise 
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subjectivity, the reality of only one analyst working on the material remains. This limitation 
could be overcome by working with a partner. The method's greatest strength, on the other 
hand, is the extensive possibilities it offers for in-depth analysis of the framing devices. 
As a future topic using this same method, the framing of Abe specifically across different 
newspapers would be extremely interesting to undertake, especially given Asahi and 
Yomiuri's vastly different images of him. Introducing more newspapers from all over the 
political spectrum into the comparison would broaden the picture. This would build a solid 
mapping of both Abe's public image and the main newspapers' political alignments beyond 
self-description. Given Yomiuri's conspicuous lack of opinion independent of the government, 
a more in-depth look at this one newspaper specifically, across several recent political topics, 
would be necessary to determine its level of journalistic independence and true views. 
Regarding the APOC law, meanwhile, a follow-up examination into the ways the law has 
come to be used so far warrants interest, to see whether Yomiuri's or Asahi's frames for the 
future hold true. The Tokyo Olympics, one of Abe's stated primary reasons for pushing the 
law, still lie ahead, now newly moved to 2021. 
Whichever newspaper's vision for Japan's future with the APOC has come true, this research 
has demonstrated that the news we read make a significant difference in the reality we live in. 
Japan has been thought of as a monolithic and unfailingly polite society, but results as divided 
as these, and the varied, colourful and sometimes scathing language in the material, should 
give cause to update those views.  
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11. Referenced articles in the dataset 
                                                          
i
 Yomiuri Shimbun 22.3.2017: テロ準備罪法案 国会提出 政府 成立要件を厳格化 
ii
 Asahi Shimbun 22.3.2017: 「共謀罪」全面対決へ 与野党、会期末にらみ 法案閣議決定 
iii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 22.3.2017: ［社説］テロ準備罪法案 政府は堂々と意義を主張せよ 
iv
 Asahi Shimbun 1.4.2017: （Ｍｅｄｉａ Ｔｉｍｅｓ）「共謀罪」か「テロ準備罪」か 報道各社、割
れる表記 
v
 Yomiuri Shimbun 28.5.2017: 書簡は「国連総意でない」 テロ準備罪巡り、事務総長 
vi
 Asahi Shimbun 1.4.2017: （Ｍｅｄｉａ Ｔｉｍｅｓ）「共謀罪」か「テロ準備罪」か 報道各社、割
れる表記 
vii
 Asahi Shimbun 22.3.2017: 「共謀罪」全面対決へ 与野党、会期末にらみ 法案閣議決定 
viii
 Asahi Shimbun 7.4.2017: 「共謀罪」攻防 政権、会期内成立狙う ４野党「廃案を」訴え 衆院審
議入り 
ix
 Asahi Shimbun 20.5.2017: （時時刻刻）「共謀罪」疑問残し強行 法相答弁、迷走のまま 
x
 Asahi Shimbun 25.4.2017: （問う「共謀罪」 表現者から）のっぺらぼうの社会、憎悪うむ ドリア
ン助川さん 
xi
 Asahi Shimbun 12.5.2017: （社説）「共謀罪」審議 採決ありきは許されぬ 
xii
 Asahi Shimbun 20.5.2017: （天声人語）「共謀罪」、衆院委で可決 
xiii
 Asahi Shimbun 22.3.2017: 監視の恐怖さらに 「共謀罪」法案 
xiv
 Asahi Shimbun 7.4.2017: （社説）「共謀罪」審議 政権の体質が見える 
xv
 Yomiuri Shimbun 7.6.2017: 会期末へ 民進徹底抗戦 参院法務委 委員長解任決議案,  
xvi
 Yomiuri Shimbun 16.6.2017: ［編集手帳］６月１６日 
xvii
 Asahi Shimbun 26.4.2017: （声）官僚任せの国会答弁、恥と思え 
xviii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 16.6.2017: 基礎からわかるテロ準備罪法＝特集 
xix
 Asahi Shimbun 5.5.2017: （いちからわかる！）テロを防ぐための国際条約があるの？ 
xx
 Yomiuri Shimbun 22.3.2017: ［スキャナー］「共謀罪と別」強調 テロ準備罪法案 政府 対象・範
囲絞る 
xxi
 Asahi Shimbun 30.5.2017: （声）「共謀罪」公明は拙速でいいの？ 
xxii
 Asahi Shimbun 5.6.2017: （声）聖書の教えも監視対象だった 
xxiii
 Asahi Shimbun 18.5.2017: （耕論）「共謀罪」疑問なお 山田秀樹さん、落合洋司さん、宮下紘さん 
xxiv
 Asahi Shimbun 18.4.2017: （声）テロの恐怖体験で「共謀罪」支持 
xxv
 Yomiuri Shimbun 22.3.2017: ［社説］テロ準備罪法案 政府は堂々と意義を主張せよ 
xxvi
 Yomiuri Shimbun 20.5.2017: 組織犯罪対策に不可欠 一般人に適用 ありえぬ 国松元警察庁長官に
聞く 
xxvii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 22.3.2017: ［スキャナー］「共謀罪と別」強調 テロ準備罪法案 政府 対象・範
囲絞る 
xxviii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 24.4.2017: ［社説］テロ準備罪法案 国民の不安を丁寧に払拭せよ 
xxix
 Yomiuri Shimbun 10.5.2017: ［社説］テロ準備罪審議 政府参考人の答弁は問題ない 
xxx
 Yomiuri Shimbun 7.4.2017: ［スキャナー］「犯罪」判断基準 焦点に テロ準備罪法案 
xxxi
 Asahi Shimbun 6.4.2017: 「共謀罪」追及、法相に照準 ４野党、廃案掲げ質疑へ 
xxxii
 Asahi Shimbun 13.6.2017: 「共謀罪」週内に成立方針 自公、会期内目指す 
xxxiii
 Asahi Shimbun 7.4.2017: 「共謀罪」攻防 政権、会期内成立狙う ４野党「廃案を」訴え 衆院審
議入り 
xxxiv
 Asahi Shimbun 20.4.2017: 「対テロ」「監視強化」論戦 「共謀罪」実質審議入り 
xxxv
 Yomiuri Shimbun 24.5.2017: ［社説］テロ準備罪法案 普通の国民は監視の対象外だ
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xxxvi
 Yomiuri Shimbun 16.6.2017: 基礎からわかるテロ準備罪法＝特集 
xxxvii
 Asahi Shimbun 30.5.2017: （社説）「共謀罪」審議 国内外の懸念に応えよ 
xxxviii
 Asahi Shimbun 15.6.2017: 疑問、残したまま 「共謀罪」法案、きょう成立 
xxxix
 Asahi Shimbun 7.4.2017: 「共謀罪」攻防 政権、会期内成立狙う ４野党「廃案を」訴え 衆院審
議入り 
xl
 Asahi Shimbun 18.4.2017; 朝日新聞社世論調査 質問と回答 
xli
 Asahi Shimbun 5.5.2017: 「条約、対テロ目的でない」 国連指針を執筆・米教授 「共謀罪」政府説
明と矛盾 
xlii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 31.3.2017: 自公 テロ準備罪で隙間風 審議入り 折り合えず 自民 都議選で不
信感 
xliii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 7.4.2017: ［スキャナー］「犯罪」判断基準 焦点に テロ準備罪法案 
xliv
 Yomiuri Shimbun 28.3.2017: ［社説］１７年度予算成立 「森友」一色の議論で良いのか 
xlv
 Yomiuri Shimbun 24.5.2017: テロ準備罪 衆院通過 不安あおらず冷静な議論を（解説） 
xlvi
 Yomiuri Shimbun 15.6.2017: ［スキャナー］テロ準備罪 与党「奇策」 参院「中間報告」 自民、
公明に配慮 
xlvii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 16.6.2017: ［論点スペシャル］テロ準備罪法成立 どう見る 
xlviii
 Asahi Shimbun 20.5.2017: 「共謀罪」熟議なき可決 採決強行、異論を軽視 自公維、賛成多数 
衆院委 
xlix
 Asahi Shimbun 15.6.2017: 疑問、残したまま 「共謀罪」法案、きょう成立 
l
 Asahi Shimbun 22.4.2017: （社説）「共謀罪」審議 数の力を乱用するな 
li
 Asahi Shimbun 16.6.2017: 言論の府、審議封殺 「中間報告」自民内でも苦言 「共謀罪」法成立 
lii
 Asahi Shimbun 31.3.2017: 「共謀罪」優先、他の法案は？ ６日審議入り方針、野党反発 
liii
 Asahi Shimbun 17.5.2017: （声）投票を放棄すれば人権をも失う 
liv
 Yomiuri Shimbun 23.5.2017: テロ準備罪きょう衆院通過 自民方針、野党は抵抗の構え 
lv
 Yomiuri Shimbun 29.3.2017: 訓練や標的監視も「テロ等」準備行為 政府が答弁書 
lvi
 Yomiuri Shimbun 16.6.2017: ［社説］テロ準備罪成立 凶行を未然に防ぐ努力続けよ 
lvii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 16.6.2017: 都議選前 駆け込み決着 テロ準備罪法成立 運営「乱暴」 与党も戸
惑い 
lviii
 Asahi Shimbun 16.6.2017: 刑事司法の大転換点 「共謀罪」法成立 
lix
 Asahi Shimbun 13.5.2017: 「共謀罪」の問題、指摘続々 自公、１８日通過目指す 
lx
 Asahi Shimbun 6.4.2017: 「共謀罪」追及、法相に照準 ４野党、廃案掲げ質疑へ 
lxi
 Asahi Shimbun 31.3.2017: 「成案出た」金田法相へ、民進が質問４０項目 「共謀罪」法案 
lxii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 18.4.2017: 民進 法相に質問集中 衆院決算委 「森友」関連１問だけ テロ準備
罪法案追及 
lxiii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 16.6.2017［編集手帳］６月１６日 
lxiv
 Asahi Shimbun 27.4.2017:（問う「共謀罪」 表現者から）「異質」切り捨て、加速する懸念 落合
恵子さん 
lxv
 Asahi Shimbun 6.6.2017: （問う「共謀罪」 学問の世界から）怒りの抗議、重なるリットン調査団 
加藤陽子さん 
lxvi
 Yomiuri Shimbun 20.4.2017: テロ準備罪 早速火花 政府参考人採決巡り騒然 全会一致 慣例破る 
lxvii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 20.5.2017: テロ準備罪 安堵と抗議 衆院委可決 
lxviii
 Asahi Shimbun 20.5.2017: 審議、わずか３０時間 「共謀罪」採決、「煮詰まらないまま」 
lxix
 Asahi Shimbun 1.6.2017: （問う「共謀罪」）審議を吟味、音読広がる 臨場感あふれる再現、苦笑
いとため息 
lxx
 Asahi Shimbun 7.4.2017: （社説）「共謀罪」審議 政権の体質が見える 
lxxi
 Asahi Shimbun 22.3.2017: 監視の恐怖さらに 「共謀罪」法案 
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lxxii
 Asahi Shimbun 14.5.2017: 筋書き通りの自白、危惧 「共謀罪」少ない物証、供述頼みに？ 
lxxiii
 Asahi Shimbun 22.5.2017:（声）「共謀罪」、尾行体験思い出す 
lxxiv
 Yomiuri Shimbun 16.6.2017: テロ準備罪法 歓迎と懸念 警察幹部 該当行為「慎重に検討」 
lxxv
 Yomiuri Shimbun 16.6.2017: ［論点スペシャル］テロ準備罪法成立 どう見る 
lxxvi
 Yomiuri Shimbun 23.5.2017: 政府 国連人権理事会に抗議 テロ準備罪懸念の書簡受け 
lxxvii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 30.5.2017: 国連書簡 首相が批判 
lxxviii
 Asahi Shimbun 22.3.2017: 「共謀罪」全面対決へ 与野党、会期末にらみ 法案閣議決定 
lxxix
 Asahi Shimbun 22.3.2017:（天声人語）治安維持法の下の暮らし 
lxxx
 Asahi Shimbun 7.4.2017: （時時刻刻）「共謀罪」早くも激論 首相「テロ」前面 野党「内心を処
罰」 
lxxxi
 Asahi Shimbun 15.4.2017: （問う「共謀罪」）元刑事裁判官の弁護士に聞く 
lxxxii
 Asahi Shimbun 18.4.2017: （問う「共謀罪」）反対・懸念、表現者からも 恣意的な運用「将来分
からぬ」 
lxxxiii
 Asahi Shimbun 20.4.2017: （問う「共謀罪」 表現者から）「戦前と違う」とは思わない 半藤一
利さん 
lxxxiv
 Asahi Shimbun 19.4.2017: （問う「共謀罪」 表現者から）心の内、絶えず監視される社会に 周
防正行さん 
lxxxv
 Asahi Shimbun 21.4.2017: （問う「共謀罪」 表現者から）監視で犯罪「予防」、歯止め失う 平
野啓一郎さん 
lxxxvi
 Asahi Shimbun 26.5.2017: （声）戦争知らぬ世代へ、９２歳の憂慮 
lxxxvii
 Asahi Shimbun 16.6.2017:（声）「共謀罪」、誰のための法律なのか 
lxxxviii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 24.5.2017: ［社説］テロ準備罪法案 普通の国民は監視の対象外だ 
lxxxix
 Yomiuri Shimbun 16.6.2017: ［社説］テロ準備罪成立 凶行を未然に防ぐ努力続けよ 
xc
 Yomiuri Shimbun 7.4.2017: ［スキャナー］「犯罪」判断基準 焦点に テロ準備罪法案 
xci
 Yomiuri Shimbun 15.4.2017: テロ準備罪で「未然防止」 法相 衆院委で審議入り 
xcii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 24.5.2017: 安全な五輪へ「前進」 テロ準備罪衆院通過 捜査幹部ら歓迎 
xciii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 16.6.2017: ［論点スペシャル］テロ準備罪法成立 どう見る 
xciv
 Yomiuri Shimbun 1.5.2017: ［気流］５月１日（投書） 
xcv
 Yomiuri Shimbun 16.6.2017: ［スキャナー］テロ抑止へ一歩 準備罪法成立 適用には高いハードル 
xcvi
 Yomiuri Shimbun 16.6.2017: ［社説］テロ準備罪成立 凶行を未然に防ぐ努力続けよ 
xcvii
 Asahi Shimbun 16.6.2017: （社説）権力の病弊 「共謀罪」市民が監視を 
xcviii
 Asahi Shimbun 28.3.2017: 新年度予算成立、９７．４兆円 「共謀罪」後半国会の焦点 
xcix
 Asahi Shimbun 26.4.2017:「市民を萎縮させる」懸念 「犯罪の主体を限定」評価 「共謀罪」衆院
委参考人質疑 
c
 Asahi Shimbun 10.6.2017:（声）野党よ、民主主義守る気骨示せ 
ci
 Yomiuri Shimbun 24.4.2017:［社説］テロ準備罪法案 国民の不安を丁寧に払拭せよ 
cii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 7.4.2017: テロ防止「五輪へ責務」 首相強調 「準備罪」審議入り 野党は廃案訴
え 
ciii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 24.5.2017: 安全な五輪へ「前進」 テロ準備罪衆院通過 捜査幹部ら歓迎 
civ
 Asahi Shimbun 17.5.2017:「警察の活動、大きく拡大」「厳格な要件、乱用はない」 「共謀罪」法
案、参考人質疑 
cv
 Yomiuri Shimbun 16.6.2017: 組織犯罪 未然に防止 テロ準備罪法成立 国会 きょう実質閉会 
cvi
 Yomiuri Shimbun 16.6.2017: ［社説］テロ準備罪成立 凶行を未然に防ぐ努力続けよ 
cvii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 30.5.2017: テロ準備罪 参院で攻防開始 
cviii
 Yomiuri Shimbun 22.3.2017: テロ準備罪法案 国会提出 政府 成立要件を厳格化 
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cix
 Asahi Shimbun 24.5.2017:「共謀罪」真っ向対立 自・公、英テロ触れ必要性主張／民・共、国連報
告者の懸念強調 
cx
 Asahi Shimbun 31.5.2017: 国連報告者、どんな人？ 「共謀罪」書簡に政府ピリピリ 
cxi
 Asahi Shimbun 22.3.2017:（時時刻刻）「テロ」強調、本質変わらず 政府案文言なし、異例の追加 
「共謀罪」 
cxii
 Asahi Shimbun 7.6.2017: （天声人語）印象操作という言葉 
cxiii
 Asahi Shimbun 13.5.2017: （問う「共謀罪」 言論人から）思考停止の雰囲気、それでいいのか 江
川紹子さん 
cxiv
 Yomiuri Shimbun 10.5.2017［社説］テロ準備罪審議 政府参考人の答弁は問題ない 
cxv
 Yomiuri Shimbun 22.3.2017: テロ準備罪法案 条文要旨と対象犯罪 
cxvi
 Asahi Shimbun 22.3.2017: 「共謀罪」全面対決へ 与野党、会期末にらみ 法案閣議決定 
cxvii
 Asahi Shimbun 22.3.2017: （時時刻刻）「テロ」強調、本質変わらず 政府案文言なし、異例の追
加 「共謀罪」 
cxviii
 Asahi Shimbun 7.4.2017: 「共謀罪」攻防 政権、会期内成立狙う ４野党「廃案を」訴え 衆院審
議入り 
cxix
 Asahi Shimbun 22.3.2017: （社説）「共謀罪」法案 疑問尽きない化粧直し 
cxx
 Asahi Shimbun 22.3.2017: 「共謀罪」全面対決へ 与野党、会期末にらみ 法案閣議決定 
cxxi
 Asahi Shimbun 24.3.2017: （教えて！「共謀罪」パート２：７）「テロ防止に役立つ」って本当？ 
cxxii
 Asahi Shimbun 24.5.2017: 無関心、打破したい 大学生「主張する場を守る」 「共謀罪」衆院通
過 
cxxiii
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 Asahi Shimbun 15.6.2017: （問う「共謀罪」）国会、どう見る 識者らに聞く 
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 Asahi Shimbun 16.6.2017: 民主主義の荒廃した姿 「共謀罪」法成立 東京社会部長・長谷川玲 
APPENDIX A. Codebook 
 
Does the article suggest that 
 
1. APOC is comparable to the old 共謀罪? 
2. without APOC Japan will become a safe haven for international criminals? 
3. problems of APOC could be solved by cooperation with Cannataci? 
4. the government is being uncooperative? 
5. APOC will increase public safety? 
6. PM Abe's behaviour is despotic? 
7. APOC is comparable to wartime Peace Preservation laws? 
8. APOC is necessary for ratifying the TOC treaty? 
9. JM Kaneda's incompetence is a problem in the discussion? 
10. the press has a duty to be the watchdog of power? 
11. those opposing APOC are misinformed? 
12. terrorism is a buzzword tacked onto the text? 
13. APOC is different from 共謀罪? 
14. apathetic reaction from the public is a problem? 
15. citizens should protest against APOC? 
16. similar laws in foreign countries are stricter? 
17. APOC will result in human rights limitations? 
18. APOC is necessary to protect Japan from organised crime? (other than terrorism) 
19. the opposition is using delay tactics? 
20. there is a time pressure to pass this law? 
21. the government is being uncooperative? 
22. APOC is necessary to protect Japan from terrorism? 
23. problems of APOC could be solved with meaningful debate in the parliament? 
24. Japan's current laws are insufficient? 
25. APOC will result in a surveillance society? 
26. other countries made no new laws to adhere to TOC, so Japan shouldn't either? 
27. the problems could be solved by the government explaining APOC carefully? 
28. the opposition is resisting for the sake of opposing the government? 
29. there is a duty to protect citizens' rights? 
30. the parliament has a duty to produce meaningful discussion? 
31. there is a duty to protect future generations? 
32. politicians have a duty to protect citizens? 
33. citizens do not understand the law and this is a problem? 
34. APOC is necessary for security during the Olympics? 
35. ordinary citizens may be targeted by APOC? 
36. APOC infringes the constitution? 
37. the criteria for what constitutes a crime are vague? 
38. the government wants to use APOC to increase surveillance? 
39. Japan has a duty to comply with international law? 
40. the problems could be solved by the government making concessions to the opposition? 
41. APOC may result in arbitrary investigation? 
42. the government wants to use APOC to make it harder to oppose those in power? 
43. other countries already signed the TOC so Japan should too? 
44. Justice Minister Kaneda's actions are objectionable? 
45. APOC will make police investigations easier? 
46. the problems could be solved by passing APOC quickly? 
47. the arguments of the government are inconsistent, and this is a problem? 
48. APOC should be rejected, modified, and brought up again later? 
 
does the article refer to 
49. a government source? 
50. a legal expert? 
51. an opposition politician? 
52. a protester or activist source? 
53. a member of the intelligentsia? 
54. a source in the police? 
 
does the article use images that portray 
55. disorder in the parliament? 
56. danger imagery such as bombs, guns or explosions? 
57. protesters or crowds of people? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B. Full list of framing and reasoning devices 
The devices for each frame are listed by order of frequency in the newspaper where that was 
the dominant frame.  
Security frame 
Devices 
Yomiuri 
Shimbun 
Asahi 
Shimbun 
stereotype: opposition as contrarian 59 0 
problem source: irresponsibility of opposition 48 11 
problem source: opponents are misinformed 38 9 
problem: danger of terrorist attack 35 14 
solution: urgency 35 2 
problem: danger of other organised crime 27 5 
reason: need to sign TOC 27 21 
solution: careful government explanation 26 1 
reason: counterterrorism 25 26 
consequence: safe Olympics 23 13 
comparison: difference to old Anti-conspiracy bill 17 1 
consequence: ease of investigation 16 5 
problem source: opposition's delay tactics 15 0 
solution: government concessions 12 1 
problem: insufficiency of current law 11 7 
duty: comply with international law 10 5 
duty: protect citizens' lives and public order 7 3 
appeal to emotion: shame 7 0 
problem: safe haven for criminals if TOC is not 
ratified 4 1 
consequence: public safety 4 2 
comparison: stricter foreign laws 3 5 
visual: disorder in parliament 2 0 
visual: terrorist imagery 3 0 
 
  
Freedom frame 
Devices 
Asahi 
Shimbun 
Yomuri 
Shimbun 
stereotype: Abe as despot 179 24 
consequence: human rights limitations 154 8 
problem: ordinary people targeted 128 17 
problem: government authoritarianism 110 18 
consequence: surveillance society 90 11 
problem: vague criteria 83 10 
problem: possibility of arbitrary investigation 63 9 
problem source: inconsistency of arguments 62 0 
comparison: Peace Preservation Act 60 1 
reason: making it harder to oppose government 59 0 
problem: terrorism unrelated to law 55 0 
comparison: similarity to old Anti-conspiracy bill 45 1 
duty: meaningful debate 34 6 
solution: meaningful debate 33 0 
solution: raise voices in protest 28 0 
consequence: infringing constitution 24 0 
problem source: apathetic citizens 22 0 
problem: lack of citizen understanding 21 0 
reason: increasing surveillance 18 3 
visual: protesters 13 1 
duty: must protect future generations 12 0 
duty: watchdog press 11 0 
duty: must protect rights 8 2 
solution: cooperation with Cannataci 5 0 
comparison: other countries made no new laws 
for TOC 
4 0 
solution: reject it and try again 2 0 
solution: careful consideration 0 3 
  
